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Cert to Michigan 
Supreme Court 
(Kavanaugh 
& Coleman [CJ] , 
dissenting: Moody, 
concurring in result) 
State/Criminal 
Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends: (1) that the Michigan Supreme 
Court erred in holding that protective searches, commonly known 
as Terry searches, are limited to pat-down searches of people, 
and (2) that marijuana seized from the trunk of resp's car was 
properly seized pursuant to an inventory search. 
2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: Resp was convicted of 
-2-
admissibility of certain evidence introduced against defendant 
over his objection at trial. The facts relating to the search 
'-----"? 
are as follows. One night two deputies spotted resp driving at 
an excessive speed. The deputies saw the car proceed down a side 
road and then swerve, coming to a stop in a ditch. The deputies 
approached the car. Resp met the deputies at the back of his 
car. Resp produced his license only after being asked twice for 
it. The deputy then asked to see resp's vehicle registration. 
When the defendant did not respond, the officer repeated his 
request, whereupon resp began walking toward the open door of his 
car. The deputies followed. As the deputies approached the open 
door, they saw a~nife on the floor of the driver's side of the 
car. The deputies told resp to stop and to put his hands on the 
roof of the car. He did. One deputy retrieved the knife and the 
v other conducted a pat-down search, which revealed no weapons. 
Al.. ~.I"W.- (?.) 
One deputy then shined~hi~ flashlight into the front seat of the 
_J~ car to search for other weapons, petn. at 15, and saw something 
~~leather under the armrest. Upon lifting the armrest, he observed 
~ a substance he believed to be marijuana. Resp was thereupon 
arrested. 
J l ,, 
The deputies then impounded the car. After determining that 
there wasVno lock on the car trunk, one of the deputies, using a 
knife, unlatched the trunk. The deputy later testified that he 
opened the trunk "because • • • there may have been more 
[marijuana] in the trunk," and because he wanted to check the 
trunk for valuables. More marijuana was found in the trunk. 
-3-
Resp moved to suppress all of the marijuana at the 
preliminary hearing and several times at trial. The trial court 
denied all such motions. The Mich. Ct. of App. affirmed resp's 
conviction. 
The Mich. Sup. Ct. reversed, with one justice dissenting and 
one concurring in the result. It held as follows. "The 
officer's entry into the vehicle cannot be justified under the 
principles set forth in Terry. Terry authorized only a limited 
pat-down search of a person suspected of criminal activity. That 
case did not authorize the search of an area." Moreover, 
protection of €he officers, the rationale of Terry, could not 
justify this search because "[a]ny weapon which might have been 
hidden in the car would have been out of reach of the fresp] and 
thus not a danger to the deputies." Having invalidated the 
initial intrusion, the majority quickly found that the marijuana 
taken from the trunk must be suppressed as a fruit of the initial 
illegal intrusion. 
Agreeing that the principles of Terry governed, the 
dissenter noted that other courts had upheld protective searches 
~----~, 
of the interior of a vehicle while the occupants were detained 
outside. These courts reasoned that officers in such encounters 
might be in danger because the accosted individuals were not 
under arrest at the time and could have returned to the vehicle 
and retrieved a weapon when the encounter with the officers 
ended. In this case, the officers faced greater danger because 
the defendant had an opportunity to enter the vehicle during his 
encounter with the deputies. Moreover, the danger to the 
~~ 
-4-
deputies clearly outweighed the minimal intrusion upon resp's 
privacy that the raising of the armrest represented. Indeed, the 
intrusion made by the officers in this case was minimal compared 
to the intrusion upheld in Terry. The dissenter then asserted 
that the seizure of the marijuana in the trunk resulted from a 
proper inventory search. 
The concurring justice concluded that the marijuana 
discovered on the front seat had been obtained legally, for the 
reasons stated in the dissent, but believed that the marijuana in 
the trunk had been obtained unlawfully. The search of the trunk 
was not a proper inventory. No standard departmental policy was 
followed in conducting the alleged inventory, and no inventory 
form was presented below. The owner of the car was present, 
unlike the owner of the car in South Dakota v. Opperman, yet the 
police did not ask the owner whether he wanted the car 
inventoried. Also, unlike Opperman, the impoundment lot to which 
resp's car would be taken was secure. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petitioner. The lower courts have split 
I (. 
on the question of whether a Terry s~ch may be made of an area 
.._._----._ 
if such a search is necessary to protect a law enforcement 
off}cer. The Mich. Sup. Ct.'s- decision conflicts with Terry's 
~tive frisk rationale. The marijuana found in the trunk was 
the result of a valid inventory search. The state's caretaking 
duty, which provided a justification for the search, arose when 
it became clear that the driver could not himself drive the car. 
Respondent. The limitation of the protective search to 




Constitution, and thus rests on an adequate state ground 
independent of the Fourth Amendment. The decision below also was 
based upon the application of well-established legal principles 
to the unique facts of the case. The court below concluded that 
the officers had no reason to believe that resp was armed or 
dangerous and that the search was motivated by a desire to 
protect themselves. None of the cases cited by petr require a 
different result. Discussion of whether the trunk search could 
be justified as an inventory search was unnecessary to the 
decision of the majority, and was only seriously discussed in the 
concurring opinion. Reviewing a concurring opinion in a Mich. 
Sup. Ct. case on a point not reached by the majority would be a 
waste of this Court's resources. Moreover, there was no basis _in 
Michigan law for jmpounding the car, thus there was no legal 
justification for the alleged inventory. In any event, the 
search of the trunk was not a valid inventory search. 
4. DISCUSSION: There does not seem to be a conflict in the 
circuits over this question. Petr cites only one case that holds 
that a Terry search cannot include the search of an area. 
However, in this case, Canal Zone v. Bender, 573 F.2d 1329 (5th 
Cir. 1978), the CA 5 held that the search was not motivated by 
the officer's concern for their safety because the officers did 
not frisk the defendants. 
The decision belo~oes conflict with cases in which area 
Terry searches have been held consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. The holding below can fairly be said to rest on 




search violated both the state and federal constitutions. It is 
fairly clear, however, that the Mich. Sup. Ct. believed that the 
scope of a Terry search under the state constitution was 
identical to the scope of such a se: rch under t~deral 
Constitution. The court was not attempting to give the Michigan 
Constitution independent scope. The court relied not on its own 
precedent but on federal precedent. The decision below does not 
rest on a factual finding that the deputies' search was not 
motivated by their concern for their own safety. The Mich. Sup. 
Ct. did say that the protective rationale of Terry was 
inapplicable because resp could have posed no danger to the 
deputies. However, that statement was an alternative holding and 
seems completely wrong. 
The conflict the opinion below creates is not severe enough 
to demand the Court's attention at this time. 
With respect to the trunk search issue, petr has shown no 
need for the Court to discuss the inventory exception in the 
context of this case. 
I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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81-256 Michigan v. Long 
This is a pre-bench memo identification of the 
issues and arguments in this case that is described as 
whether the rationale of a Terry stop may be extended to 
an "area" here within a automobile - as contrasted with a 
weapons frisk of a person's clothing. 
Tow officers observed respondent's car, shortly 
after midnight, driving at an excessive speech and ending 
up in the ditch. Respondent was out of the vehicle when 
the officers requested drivers license and registration. 
Respondent had left his door open, and when he moved to 
reenter the car an officer observed a large knife lying of 
the floor board. This prompted a pat down (negative), and 
a flash light examination of the front seat area of the 
vehicle. An object was observed beneath the arm rest that 
possibly could have a contained a weapon. When examined, 
it contained marijuana. The officers then "impounded" the 
automobile, and opened the unlocked trunk and found 
marijuana in it. 
Several important facts are not disputed: the 
state makes no claim to probable cause either to search 
the vehicle before discovering the knife or to arrest for 
,. 
2. 
what appear to be only a traffic violation. Respondent 
does not deny that the stop of the vehicle was lawful. 
Michigan Supreme Court (reversed respondent's conviction) 
The Court did not question the pat down of 
respondent's person. This clearly was justified after the 
knife was observed. The court held, however, that Terry 
"authorized only a limited pat down search of a person 
suspected of criminal activity. That case did not 
authorize the search of an area." 
The court added that any weapon which might have 
been hidden in the car, would have been out of the reach 
of respondent and thus no danger to the officers. 
The court further held that the search of the 
trunk was an illegal fruit of the search of the front 
seat, and could not be justified as an inventory search. 
New York v. Belton, referred to only in a 
footnote, was irrelevant because defendant had not been 
arrested prior to the search of the interior of the car 
(Ross had not been decided by us, but it would not be 
applicable because there was not probable cause to search 
the automobile). 
The SG's Brief (better than that of the state) 
The rationale of Terry applies to the "limited 
inspection" of the front seat. In view of defendant's 
conduct, and the discovery of a weapon on the floor, the 
police acted reasonably in inspecting the front seat for 
other weapons. The Michigan court said that any weapons 
there would not have been a threat to the officers. But 
the officers were confronted by a dilemma. 
sure there was probable cause to arrest. 
They were not 
Unless they 
arrested, the suspect would reenter the vehicle where the 
presence of a gun, for example, would constitute a danger. 
The SG argues persuasively that officers have to 
make "on the scene judgments". Not infrequently, they are 
shot in the course of dealing with suspects. Given the 
options, they acted reasonably in this case and the Terry 
doctrine should apply. 
Moreover, a motorist's expectation of privacy as 
to what can be observed or found by a limited search of 
the interior {particularly the front seat of an 
automobile) is minimal. 
The SG also argues that the principle of New 
York v. Belton should be applied. If officers may search 
the entire interior of a car, incident to arrest, even 
when the arrestee has been removed from the car, officers 
4. 
such as those in this case - should be allowed the 
conduct a limited Terry search for weapons when they have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect was armed 
and dangerous. Courts should not speculate, after the 
fact, as to alternative measures that might have been 
taken. 
Search of Trunk 
The SG's argument with respect to this aspect of 
the case is less convincing. Apparently, the officers 
arrested respondent after they found the knife and 
marijuana, and purported to take the car itself into 
custody. Yet, the state does not rely on search incident 
to arrest. Rather, it relies only on the right to make an 
inventory search, citing Opperman. 
As both the marijuana from the trunk and from 
the front seat were admit ted in evidence, I suppose we 
have to decide both issues. If, however, we agreed with 
the state as to the front seat inspection, we could remand 
to the Michigan court to determine in light of our 
opinion - whether search of the trunk was justified. 
I would prefer, however, to go ahead and address 
the search of the trunk issue. The SG recognizes that 
Opperman does not control because this was not a regular 
5. 
departmental type inventory procedure. But other aspects 
of Opperman do support the inventory search justification. 
In Opperman, a locked passenger compartment, including an 
unlocked glove compartment, were searched. Here, only an 
unlocked trunk was searched. 
less than where the entire 
Expectations of privacy were 
vehicle was locked as in 
Opperman. In any event, a search on the scene is no more 
intrusive, and may be more effective in forestalling 
claims of theft, than a subsequent search. 
* * * 
My tentative view is that the inspection 
(search} of the front seat area was fully justified by the 
circumstances. This may be another exception to the 
warrant clause, where reasonable suspicion entitled the 
officers to protect themselves. This, of course, is the 
rationale of Terry and in general is supported by the 
rationale of Belton. 
I am less persuaded as to the validity of the 




' • .J 
lfp/ss 02/21/83 
81-256 Michigan v. Long 
This is a pre-bench memo identification of the 
issues and arguments in this case that is described as 
whether the rationale of a Terry stop may be extended to 
an "area" ~e within a automobile - as contrasted with a 
weapons frisk of a person's clothing. 
T~ officers observed respondent's car, shortly 
after midnight, driving at an excessive speech and ending 
up in the ditch. Respondent was out of the vehicle when 
the officers requested drivers license and registration. 
Respondent had left his door open, and when he moved to 
reenter the car an officer observed a large knife lying of 
the floor board. This prompted a pat down (negative), and 
a flash light examination of the front seat area of the 
vehicle. An object was observed beneath the arm rest that 
possibly could have a contained a weapon. When examined, 
it contained marijuana. The officers then "impounded" the 
--....___ 
automobile, and opened the unlocked trunk and found 
marijuana in it. 
Several important facts are not disputed: the 
state makes no claim to probable cause either to search 
the knife or to arrest for 
ll f v ~hat appear to be only a traffic violation. Respondent 
f.tY does not deny that the stop of the vehicle was lawful. 
Michigan Supreme Court (reversed respondent's conviction) 
The Court did not question the pat down of 
respondent's person. This clearly was justified after the 
knife was observed. The court held, however, that Terry . _... 
"authorized only a limited pat down search of a person 
suspected of criminal activity. That case did not 
authorize the search of an area." 
~f 
The court added that any weapon w~ might have 
been hidden in the car, would have been out of the reach 
of respondent and thus no danger to the officers. 
The court further held that the search of the 
trunk was an illegal fru.i t of the search of the front ..--......,.... .. -=-----~ .... ,.....,....._ 
seat, and could not be justified as an inventory search. 
New York v. Belton, referred to only in a 
footnote, was irrelevant because defendant had not been 
arrested prior to the search of the interior of the car 
(Ross had not been decided by us, but it would not be 
applicable because there was noy probable cause to search 
the automobile). 
The SG's Brief (better than that of the state) 
' > 
The rationale of Terry applies to the "limited 
inspect ion" of the front seat. In ~iew of defendant's 
conduct, and the discovery of a weapon on the floor, the 
police acted reasonably in inspecting the front seat for 
other weapons. The Michigan court said that any weapons 
there would not have been a threat to the officers. But 
the officers were confronted by a dilemma. They were not 
sure there was probable cause to arrest. Unless they 
arrested, the suspect would reenter the vehicle where the 
presence of a gun, for example, would constitute a danger. 
The SG argues persuasively that officers have to 
make "on the scene judgments". --- .........__.... ........ Not infrequently, they are -
shot in the course of dealing with suspects. Given the 
options, they acted reasonably in this case and the Terry 
doctrine should apply. 
Moreover, a motorist's expectation of privacy as 
.____...... -- -
to what can be observed or found by a limited search of 
the interior (particularly the front seat of an 
automobile) is ~ 1. 
The SG also argues that the principle of New 
York v. Belton should be applied. If officers may search 
the entire interior of a car, incident to arrest, even 
when the arrestee has been removed from the car, officers 
such as those in this case - should be allowed the 
conduct a limited Terry search for weapons when they have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect was armed 
and dangerous. Courts should not speculate, after the 
fact, as to alternative measures that might have been 
taken. 
Search of Trunk 
The SG's argument with respect to this aspect of 
the case is less convincing. Apparently, the officers 
arrested respondent after they found the knife and 
marijuana, and purported to take the car itself into 
custody. Yet, the state does not rely on search incident 
to arrest. Rather, it relies only on the right to make an 
inventory search, citing Opperman. 
As both the marijuana from the trunk and from 
the front seat were admitted in evidence, I suppose we 
have to decide both issues. If, however, we agreed with 
the state as to the front seat inspection, we could remand 
to the Michigan court to determine - in light of our 
opinion - whether search of the trunk was justified. 
I would prefer, however, to go ahead and address 
the search of the trunk issue. The SG recognizes that 
Opperman does not control because this was not a regular 
departmental type inventory procedure. But other aspects 
of Opperman do support the inventory search justification. 
In Opperman, a locked passenger compartment, including an 
unlocked glove compartment, were searched. Here, only an 
unlocked trunk was searched. Expectations of privacy were 
less than where the entire vehicle was locked as in 
Opperman. In any event, a search on the scene is no more 
intrusive, and may be more effective in forestalling 
claims of theft, than a subsequent search. 
* * * 
My tentative view is that the inspection 
(search} of the front seat area was fully justified by the 
circumstances. This may be another exception to the 
warrant clause, where reasonable suspicion entitled the 
officers to protect themselves. This, of course, is the 
rationale of Terry and in general is supported by the 
rationale of Belton. 
I am less persuaded as to the validity of the 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell February 22, 1983 
From: Rives 
No. 82-256, Michigan v. Long 
Questions Presented 
1. Whether Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), authorizes a 
search of the interior of a car when the driver is standing 
outside of the car; and 
l. 
2. Even if the search of the car interior were not justified, 
whether the police may search the trunk of the car pursuant to 
an inventory search. 
I. Background 
Shortly after midnight, Deputies Howell and Lewis 
were on routine road patrol in an unpopulated, rural area in 
Michigan. A car going the opposite direction drove past at 
approximately 71 miles per hour. The officers turned their car 
around and pursued the speeding car. The car maae a left turn, 
swerving off the road and running into the ditch. 
As the deputies approached, resp who was the only 
occupant of the car, got out, left the door on the driver's 
side open and met the deputies at the rear of the car. Howell 
asked resp for his driver's license. Resp did not say anything 
and when Howell asked for the license a second time, resp 
produced it. Howell then asked for the car registration and 
proof of insurance. Again, resp did not say anything. The 
request was repeated and resp began walking towards the open 
car door. Both deputies accompanied resp. Howell testified 
that resp was cooperative, that he "appeared to be under the 
influence of something," and that he acted scared. According 
to Howell, resp's demeanor was different than that of people 
who are nervous because they have been stopped hy a police 
officer. His demeanor instead was more typical of people who 
"have open intox in the car or something like that." App. 25a. 
As they approached the open door, the deputies saw a closed 
3. 
buck knife--a folding knife with a four inch blade--lying on 
the front floorboard. On seeing the knife, they had resp place 
his hands on the roof of the car while they frisked him. The 
frisk produced no weapons. After the frisk resp was standing ------at the rear of the car under the control of Lewis. Howell, who 
was positioned between resp and the car door, determined that 
it was necessary to search the car to see if there were any 
weapons in the car. 
Deputy Howell testified: 
"Okay, after I frisked him I walked up to the door of 
the car looking for another weapon. I shined my 
light into the car. There were arm rests--front seat 
of the vehicle was equipped with arm rests. I saw 
something that appeared to be under the arm rest. At 
this time I kneeled in the vehicle and I lifted the 
arm rest. There was a leather pouch, it appeared to 
be a long ~ed wallet, folded in half, it wasn't 
what you would call a wallet but it appeared 
something like that. It was laying underneath the 
arm rest. 
Lifting the armrest revealed that the leather pouch, which was 
open, contained a plastic bag full of marijuana. The plastic 
bag protruded from the open pouch. 
The officers arrested resp for possession of 
marijuana. They searched the interior of the car for further 
contraband, but did not find any. They decided to impound the 
car and asked for the keys. When resp handed over only one 
key, Howell asked resp for the trunk key, which resp said he 
did not have. Howell noticed that the trunk lock had been 
knocked out and used his own pocket knife to open the trunk. 
His reasons for searching the trunk were:"[n]umber one, because 
I already found marijuana, suspected marijuana, in the interior 
q. 
of the car, there may have been more in the trunk. Secondly, I 
check them for valuables, I do." App. 17a. A search of the 
trunk revealed two bags full of 75 pounds of marijuana. 
The trial court refused to suppress the evidence. 
The intermediate appellate court found that the search of the 
car interior was constitutional under Terry and that the search 
of the trunk was a valid inventory search under South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The~ate supreme court 
reversed. It noted first that Terry had authorized only a pat-
down search of a person. It had not authorized a search of the 
area adjacent to him. Alternatively, the court observed that 
the scope of a Terry search must be limited to the reasons for 
making the search. Here the search exceeded its reason--to 
provide the officers with protection. In this case, resp was 
outside of the car, under control of one of the officers, and 
in no position to reach inside the car. Because the resp could 
not get to the whatever weapons might be in the car, there was 
no need for the officers to search the car. 
The court also suppressed the marijuana that was 
found in the car trunk. It noted the state's argument that the 
search of the trunk was valid either as an inventory search or 
a search incident to an arrest. The court found, however, that 
the search of the car trunk was based on the discovery of the 
bag of marijuana in the car interior. As such it was a fruit 
of an unlawful search and should be suppressed. Although the 
court did not discuss why it rejected the state's inventory 
search argument, it may have concluded that the officer's 
dominant motive for searching the trunk was the discovery of 
marijuana in the car interior and that the inventory rationale 
did not provide an independent basis for the search. 
II. Discussion 
This case presents three issues. First, whether the 
decision below rests on independent and adequate state grounds. 
Second, whether the search of the car interior was reasonable 
in light of the intrusiveness of the search and the reasons for 
the police action. Third, whether the search of the car trunk 
was a valid inventory search. 
A. Whether There Are Adequate and Independent State Grounds 
The state supreme court stated that the issue 
presented was whether the search of the car interior "violated 
the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." App. to Pet. for Cert. 17. It defined 
"constitutional" as referring to both the United States and the 
State Constitutions. See id., at 17, n. 4. Although the state 
~
supreme court based its subsequent discussion almost 
exclusively on Terry and other federal precedent, it held that 
the search of the car interior violated both the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and art 1, §11 of 
the Michigan Constitution, the state analogue of the Fourth 
Amendment. See id., at 19. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), found that 
invocation of state constitutional grounds was not sufficient 
o. 
when the construction given the state constitutional provision 
was predicated on the interpretation of the analagous federal 
provision. If one looked only at the decision below, it would 
seem that the analysis in Prouse is applicable here. The state 
supreme court relied primarily on the federal constitutional 
standard established in Terry. As in Prouse, it noted in 
concluding that both the state and federal constitutions were 
violated. In the same month, however, in which the state court 
,. -
issued this case, it issued People v. Secrest, 413 Mich. 521 _________...... 
(1982). In Secrest, the court stated: 
"There are differences in wording between the two 
[the Fourth Amendment and the analogous state 
provision]. As a result, we have imposed a higher 
s~andard under the state prov1s1Qn than the federal 
when the~em seized Is not one within the proviso of 
the third sentence of art 1, §11. People v. Moore, 
391 Mich 426, 216 NW2d 770 (1974); People v. Beavers, 
393 Mich 554, 567-568, 227 NW2d 511 (1975). In doing 
so, however, we have in the past looked to federal 
case authority in our analysis of the state 
constitutional question, and we do so here." 
Secrest indicates that the Michigan courts look to federal law 
for guidance but do not feel compelled to adopt the federal 
interpretation. Because there is substantial evidence that the 
state court was relying would 
recommend that the case A remand would be 
consistent with your vot stage. The cert pool 
memo indicates that you voted to deny in part because it was 
unclear whether the decision rested on state or federal 
grounds. 
B. Whether the Search of the Car Interior Was Reasonable 
I 
7. 
The state supreme court found the search here invalid 
for two reasons. First, Terry authorized only a limited pat-
down search of a person. It did not authorize search of an 
area. Second, given the facts of this case, the search was not 
necessary to protect the officer's safety. 
The first rationale advanced by the state supreme 
court does not seem consistent with Terry v. Ohio. In Terry, 
the Court recognized that a search "must be limited to what is 
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to 
harm the officer or others nearby." Id., at 26. Although only 
a pat-down search was necessary in Terry to ensure the 
officer's safety, Terry suggests that the scope of the search ~ 
will vary depending on the particular facts of each case. 
Thus, if a broader search of the area within the supect's - ---------~-----------~------------------
immediate reach were necessary, it would seem that Terry would 
authorize it. 
The more difficult question is whether the scope of 
the search undertaken here was reasonable in light of the 
circumstances of this case. In United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring), you noted 
that three factors were relevant to making this determination: 
(i) the public interest served by the search; (ii) the nature 
and scope of the intrusion; and (iii) the objective facts upon 
which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his 
knowledge and expertise. There can be little doubt but that 
there is a strong public interest in ensuring the safety of 
policemen. Traffic stops present a particular problem since 
o. 
the police are forced to approach the offender's car and expose 
themselves to unknown risks. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
u.s. 106 (1977). On the other hand, a search of a suspect's 
car is an intrusive measure. Despite the lesser expectation of , 
privacy in cars than in homes, a person retains a substantial 
expectation of privacy in his car. People traditionally carry 
personal effects in their cars and ensure their privacy by 
locking and securing their cars against other people's 
intrusion. While the nature of the intrusion--searching the 
car--was fairly great, the scope of the search was relatively ~ 
limited in this instance. Deputy Howell only directed his ~~ 
flashlight into the car and lifted the armrest to get a better 
view of the leather pouch underneath. 
The third factor is more problematic: whether the 
police have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 
suspect is armed and dangerous. Here, the basis of that 
suspicion is minimal. When the police approached initially, 
resp got out of the car and carne to meet them. The police did 
not indicate that he gave any sign of being dangerous. They 
described him instead as cooperative, but intoxicated. Deputy 
Howell testified that, in his professional opinion, resp acted 
scared as if he had some "open intox" in the car. The onlv 
reason to suppose that resp was an "armed and dangerous 
individual" carne from the discovery of the closed buck knife on 
the front floorboard of the car. As Deputy Howell later 
testified, there were a number of tools behind the front seat. 
This knife easily could have slid forward when the car went 
Y. 
into the ditch. Although a buck knife is larger than a normal 
pocket knife, it is not uncommon for it to be used as a tool or 
for hunting. Given resp's intoxicated, but otherwise innocuous 
conduct, the discovery of a buck knife on the floorboard of a 
car does not provide a particularly strong inference that resp 
presented a danger to the police. 
Although the discovery of the knife was the only I 
basis for the police's search, it seems sufficient when 
considered in light of this Court's precedents. In 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, the Court approved a pat-down 
search of a motorist when the officer only saw a bulge in the 
driver's pocket. If observation of a bulge is sufficient to 
justify a patdown, then it would seem that discovery of a 
large, closed knife on the front floorboard is sufficient to 
justify some sort of search of the car to determine if there 
were other weapons present. 
The state supreme court, relying on Chimel, found 
that the search should not extend beyond the area that was 
within resp's immediate reach, since no greater search was 
necessary to protect the officer's safety. While the state 
supreme court's reasoning has a certain appeal, it is 
questionable whether it applied Chimel correctly. In Chimel, 
the suspect had been arrested and was under the officer's 
control. Because the arrest restricted the defendant's 
mobility in Chimel, there was only a need to search the area in 
his immediate control. Here, the resp was not under arrest and 
retained a greater degree of mobility. He may reenter the car, 
10. 
as he did here, to get papers or documents. He definitely will 
reenter the car after the police have finished talking to him. 
Thus, the area that is within the supect's control is 
potentially greater than it is where an arrest has taken place. 
When the police have reason to believe that there may be 
weapons in the car, as they did here, then it would seem that 
the limited search that occurred here is not prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment. 
While the search in this case did not entail a 
substantial invasion of resp's privacy, I doubt that the 
principle that justifies this search can be limited easily. To 
ensure that there are no weapons that a suspect could use on 
reentering his car, an officer typically would have to look in 
the glove compartment, under the seat and examine any closed 
containers. If the closed container is soft, such as a leather 
pouch, an officer can satisfy his concern for safety solely by 
"patting down" the pouch. If, however, there is a closed box 
sitting on the seat, only a search of the box itself will 
reveal whether it contains dangerous weapons. Extending a 
protective search this far would mean that an articulable 
suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous most likely 
will entitle an officer to conduct as extensive a search of the 
car interior as he could if he had probable cause to arrest the 
suspect. 
B. Whether the Search of the Trunk Was Valid 
After discovering the marijuana, the deputies 
arrested resp and searched the interior of the car, as 
permitted by New York v. Belton, 453 u.s. 454 (1981). They 
discovered no contraband other than the plastic bag full of 
marijuana. They then opened the trunk and discovered the two 
bags with 75 pounds of marijuana in them. The question 
presented in the cert petn was whether this search may be 
justified as a valid inv~tory search. 1 
This case is ){istinguished from South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 u.s. 364 (1976), in which there was an 
established departmental procedure for conducting an inventory 
search. Although Deputy Howell stated that he normally 
conducted an inventory search before he impounded a car, he was 
only policeman in the department who did this. There was no 
department policy of conducting inventory searches or 
procedures to regularize the search itself. Thus, the search 
here is contrary to your concurrence in Opperman, which relied 
on the presence of "established police department rules or 
policy" that are applicable "whenever an automobile is seized." 
1Although the issue is not presented by the cert petn, the SG 
notes that the search of the trunk may be justified as a search 
incident to an arrest. Belton, however, explicitly limits such 
searches to the interior of the car. The SG also argues that the 
discovery of the bag of marijuana in the passenger compartment 
gave the police probable cause to search the trunk. This 
argument is closer, but questionable. It is common for a large 
number of people to carry small quantities of marijuana in 
plastic bags for their own use. It is questionable whether 
carrying such a bag of marijuana makes it probable that larger 
quantities of the drug are secreted in the trunk. 
See 428 u.s., at 383. In the absence of rules that regularize 
such searches the bases for the declaring the search reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment are diminished. 
This case is distinguished from Opperman also by the 
fact that the suspect was present when the car was impounded. 
In Opperman, the car had been left unattended and the police 
could not locate him in a reasonable time. See id., at 384 
(POWELL, J., concurring). Here, the suspect was present. 
Because he could have consented to impoundment without an 
inventory search, and waived any right to complain if his 
valuables were stolen, the concerns that give rise to a need 
for an inventory search are lessened. 
Conclusion 
1. The question as to whether there are independent and 
adequate state grounds is close. The state court explicitly 
relied on the state constitution and subsequently stated that 
it only looked to the federal constitutional decisions for 
guidance. Because of the closeness of the issue, I would 
recommend Krivda'ing the case. 
2. If you reach the merits, I would recommend reversing the 
decision that the search of the car interior violated the 
Fourth Amendment. On balance, the search of the passenger 
compartment was reasonable when the officer's concern for 
safety, the limited scope of the search, and the discovery of 
.L..). 
the knife are considered. Acceptance of this rationale will 
lead most likely to approving a search of the interior of a car 
whenever an officer has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
is armed and dangerous. 
3. I would recommend affirming the decision that the inventory 
~ 
search of the trunk was unreasonable, since the search lacked 
the safeguards of an established departmental rules and 
procedures. 
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Dear Thurgood, Lewis and John: 
We four are in dissent in the above. Will you, Lewis, 
be willing to undertake the dissent? 
Sincerely, 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 82-256, Michigan v. Long 
In researching state law, it turned out that this question 
was more difficult than was apparent from the parties' briefs. The 
problem arises from the "proviso" to art 1, §11, the relevant 
Michigan constitutional provision. The proviso was added to limit 
the operation of the state constitutional provision to the extent it 
would prohibit the admission of certain types of evidence from 
criminal trials. Michigan has subsequently realized that this 
H' ~ ovi s io is _,!._nope r ~ t i ve to the e xten 1:..__!:_~ nfl ict s with !;_he Fourth 
-~~ v~~endment. The result of this conflict, however, is that with 
w- t/ ~ - , 
VV ~ respect to items falling within the proviso the Michigan 
~ constitution offers no greater protection than that provided by the 
~ Fourth Amendment. Thus, any exclusion of evidence that is covered 
'~ J by the proviso necessarily presents a federal question. 
~ __ uf, J vY - . 
~- ~ -~ The question on which this case ultimately turns is 
VV ~ whether marijuana is a "narcotic drug" within the meaning of the 
~ proviso. The state statute~ne marijuana as not being a 
~;~,~i~ drug, ~~ ~~~ory provisions are not necessarily 
~~~lling as to the meaning of a constitutional provision. When 
~~~~sti~~ o~~~~ted in 1963, the state statutes 
~z:/~r~-1 v~ 
~/~,v ,/ ~ 
did define marijuana as a narcotic. Onder state laws of 
constitutional construction, the state statutes existing at the time 
the constitutional provision is ratified are strong evidence as to 
the meaning of its terms. The state courts, however, have construed 
some constitutional terms to incorporate changes occuring after 
ratification and it is not completely clear how the Michigan courts 
would treat this question. 
The state courts have not addressed this issue 
specifically. Although my research makes me question the strength 
of our position, I went ahead and wrote up a draft dissent as 
strongly, and fairly, as I could. It seemed to me that the 
strongest line of argument available was to say that this was an 
unsettled question of state law. Even if one might speculate as to 
the course the state courts would take, it is not the business of 
this Court to interpret a State's constitution for it. On reading 
this draft, you may want to reconsider your position. I think 
either position is tenable. The difference between them is I ----
believe the degree of certainty that this Court will require before 
it assumes that it has jurisdiction and the degree to which this 
Court is willing to undertake an independent analysis of state law. 
drk 03/12/83 No. 82-256 Michigan v. Long--Preliminary Draft 
Today the Court reaches out to decide an issue 
of federal constitutional law regardless of the fact that 
the state judgment may rest on an independent and adequate 
state ground. In so doing the Court transgresses on basic 
principles of federalism. 
I 
This Court consistently has recognized that it 
has no jurisdiciton over state court judgments that rest 
on independent and adequate state grounds. See Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 u.s. 648 {1979): Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 u.s. 
117, 125 {1945): Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 u.s. 207 
{1935). This principle is not merely a technical rule: it 
reflects instead this Court's limited power to review 
state decisions. As Justice Jackson, writing for the 
Court in Pitcairn, recognized: 
"[O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not 
to revise opinions. We are not permitted to 
render an advisory opinion, and if the same 
judgment would be rendered by the state court 
after we corrected its views of federal laws, 
our review would amount to nothing more than an 
advisory opinion." 324 u.s., at 126. 
In order to protect both the States' and our own 
jurisdiction, we have required that it affirmatively 
appear that the federal question was decided and that its 
decision was essential to the disposition of the case. 
See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 u.s. 551, 
555 (1940); Lynch v. New York, 293 u.s. 52 (1934). When 
it is not clear whether the decision rests on federal or 
state grounds, the Court has either dismissed the writ or 
requested the state court to clarify the grounds on which 
its judgment rests. See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 
..... 
33, 35 (1972); Mental Hygiene Dept. v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 
194, 196-197 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 u.s., at 127-
128. 
II 
In this case, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
framed the issue before it as whether the officer's 
"warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle, while 
the defendant was standing near the rear of the car under 
the control of another officer, violated the 
constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches 
and seizures." 413 Mich. 461, 471 (1982). The court 
expressly identified the applicable "constitutional 
proscription" as both the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and art 1, §11, the analagous 
provision in the Michigan Constitution. 1 See id., at 471, 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
n. 4. After analyzing the issue in light of our opinion 
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court of 
Michigan concluded, "We hold, therefore, that the 
deputies' search of the vehicle was proscribed by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art 
1, §11 of the Michigan Constitution. The evidence 
obtained pursuant to the unconstitutional search should 
have been suppressed." Id., at 472-473. 
1The language of art. 1, § 11 is similar, but not 
identical, to the language of the Fourth Amendment. It 
provides: 
"The person, houses, papers, and possessions of 
every person shall be secure from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. No warrant to search any 
place or to seize any person or things shall 
issue without describing them, nor without 
probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation. The provisions of this section 
f 
shall not be construed to bar from evidence in 
any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, 
firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous 
weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the 
curtilage of any dwelling house in this state." 
When, as here, the state court rests its holding 
explicitly on the state constitution, this ordinarily will 
be sufficient to establish that the decision is based on 
independent and adequate state grounds. 2 In this 
instance, however, there is additional evidence that the 
Court lacks jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Michigan 
repeatedly has interpreted art 1, §11 more broadly than 
the Fourth Amendment. In ~eople v. Secrest, 321 N.W.2d 
.AAJ.t~ 
368, 369 (1982), for example, it stated: -(~ ,.,.,.v~ 
"There are differences in wording ~ween the 
two [provisions]. As a result, we have imposed 
a higher standard under the state provision than 
2In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 u.s. 648, 652 (1979), we 
held that explicit reliance on a state constitutional 
provision would not be sufficient where the opinion makes 
clear that the state provision "will automatically be 
interpreted" to conform to the analogous federal 
provision. Before concluding that there were no 
independent state grounds, however, we determined that the 
state courts previously had not undertaken any independent 
analysis of their own constitution. See id., at 652 and 
nn. 4-5. As noted below in text, Michigan has interpreted 
art 1, §11 independently of the Fourth Amendment. 
the federal when the item seized is not one 
within the proviso of the third sente nce or art 
1, § 11. People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 
216 N.W.2d 770 (1974): People v. Beavers, 393 
Mich. 554, 567-568, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975). In 
doing so, however, we have in the past looked to 
federal case authority in our analysis of the 
state constitutional question, and we do so 
here." 
See also People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 567-568 (1975) 
("While the result reached today reflects an analysis of 
Federal case authority, our conclusion is based upon the 
Michigan Constitution and the protection afforded the 
people of this state against unreasonable searches and 
seizures): id., at 570 (Coleman, C.J., dissenting) ("We 
can, and on occasion do, interpret the state 
constitutional provisions as affording protection beyond 
those required ••• as a matter of Federal Constitutional 
law."): cf. People v. Plantefaber, 410 Mich. 594, 615 
(1981) (Coleman, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that state 
court has interpreted art 1, §11 more broadly than the 
Fourth Amendment). These cases leave little doubt that, 
as a general matter, Michigan courts have interpreted 
'"""--• --·----------~--~ 
their own constitution independently of the federal and 
£--!-
have relied on federal authority only where the analysis 
.1\ 
is persuasive. 
This normally would be sufficient to establish 
that the state court's judgment rests on an independent 
I 
~ p and adequate state ground. A~~ §~1, however, contains 
a provison that mandates further analysis. This proviso 
states, "The provisions of this section shall not be 
construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding 
any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other 
dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the 
curtilage of any dwelling house in this state." Thus, 
"·· 
even if a search otherwise would be unreasonable under art 
1, §11, the proviso prevents certain categories of 
evidence obtained during the search from being excluded 
from criminal trials. 
The state constitution of course cannot 
authorize the admission of evidence that the federal 
constitution would exclude and where there is a conflict 
between the two provisions the Michigan courts have 
recognized that art 1, §11 is preempted. See People v. 
Pennington, 383 Mich. 611 (1970) . As the state supreme 
court explained, this proviso "precludes a construction of 
the Michigan search and seizure clause imposing a higher 
standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures of 
items named in the provison than the United States Supreme 
Court has held applicable under the Fourth Amendment." 
~. 
See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435 (1974). In other 
words, if an item falls within the proviso, the State will 
exclude this evidence under art 1, §11 only to the extent 
that the Fourth Amendment would require its exclusion. 
As the exclusion of any evidence falling within 
this proviso necessarily presents a federal question, the 
issue on which our jurisdiction ultimately turns is -----------
whether marijuana is a "narcotic drug" within the meaning 
of the proviso. It is at once apparent that this issue 
presents solely a question of state law. And if this 
question is not settled by state decisions, the respect 
due the state courts requires that we allow them to decide 
in the first instance the scope of their own 
constitutional provisions. 
~v. 
An examination of Michigan law reveals that this 
~ 
~ ~J~ issue can hardly be described as settled. The Supreme 
~- Court of Michigan has never addressed the issue. The only 
Michigan case in which the issue has been presented 
squarely did not decide the question but held on other 
grounds, "Const 1963, art 1, §11 will no longer allow the 
marijuana to be introduced into evidence." 3 People v. 
Smith, 31 Mich. App. 366, 373 (1971). In 1966, one state 
appellate court did find that proviso would allow the 
3The analysis in Smith is not clear. Smith may have 
rejected the argument that mar1]uana was a "narcotic drug" 
on the basis of the current statutory provision. If this 
were the anaylsis, then the result today would be 
different since Michigan currently recognizes that 
marijuana is not a narcotic. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§333.7107 (1978). But Smith does not appear to have 
resolved this question. The basis of its holding appears l 
to be that the Pourth Amendment voided the proviso to art 
1, §11--a holding that is in apparent conflict with later 
state cases. Compare People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 427 
( 19 7 4) • 
....... 
admission of marijuana. See People v. Monroe, 3 Mich. 
App. 544 {1966) • 4 It did not consider, however, whether 
marijuana were a narcotic drug within the meaning of the 
state constitution, and the most recent indication of the 
v 
State's position suggests otherwise. In People v. 
Plantefaber, 410 Mich. 594 {1981), a majority of the state 
supreme court found that marijuana uncovered during a 
police search should be excluded under both the federal 
and state constitutions. Chief Justice Coleman dissented 
---------------
because neither provision, in her view, required that the 
4In People v. Barker, 18 Mich. App. 544 {1969), the 
majority did not reach the issue of whether marijuana 
seized during a search were admissible under art 1, §11. 
Judge Levin, however, reached the issue in a concurring 
opinion. He concluded that the .Fourth Amendment would 
require the exclusion of the evidence even though it 
otherwise would be admitted under art 1, §11. Judge Levin 
did not address specifically the question of whether 
mariJUana was a "narcotic drug" but apparently assumed 
that it was covered by the proviso. 
marijuana be excluded. In reaching this conclusion, she 
determined first that the search complied with the Fourth 
Amendment. She then considered whether art 1, §11 
provided Michigan citizens with greater protection than 
the Fourth Amendment. She concluded, "[o]n the facts 
herein, I find nothing in Const. 1963, art 1, §11, which 
would justify extending the protections of the state 
Constitution beyond the protection of US Const, Am IV, so 
as to require the exclusion of the challenged evidence." 
Id., at Of course, if marijuana were a narcotic drug 
within the meaning of the proviso, there would have been 
no need for Chief Justice Coleman to have considered 
whether the state constitution extended greater protection 
than the Fourth Amendment. A determination that the 
marijuana was admissible under the Fourth Amendment 
automatically would have established its admissibility 
under the Michigan constitution. I would hesitate to rest 
this Court's jurisdiction on as fragile a base as these 
scattered and sporadic decisions provide. 
The Michigan statutes do not clarify the matter 
v 
either. At present marijuana is not classified as a 
narcotic drug. "Narcotic drug" is defined instead only as 
"[o]pium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, 
or preparation of opium or opiate." See Mich. Comp. Laws 
v 
Ann. §333.7106 (1978). It is true that when art 1, §11 
was adopted in 1963, Michigan defined marijuana as a ---
narcotic drug. See 1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 172 (repealed 
1970). But it is not clear whether Michigan would 
interpret the specific constitutional term in art 1, §11 
in light of the statutory definition at the time of 
. , ...... 
enactment or whether it would choose to interpret its 
constitution to reflect the state public policy. 5 While 
this Court might speculate on the course Michigan would 
take, Michigan has not decided this question, and it is 
not the business of this Court to construe a State's 
constitution for it. 
III 
5Michigan has recognized that "[a] constitutional 
provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted 
in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws 
and with reference to them." See Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa 
Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 171 {1958). But the state court 
has also recognized that the constitutional provisions are 
to be interpreted to accomodate changed conditions. See 
Lockwood v. Commissioner of Revenue, 357 Mich. 517 {1959). 
Accordingly, the state supreme court has interpreted the 
constitutional phrase "municipal corporation" to include a 
form of municipal organization that was not recognized at 
the time the constitutional provision was ratified. See 
Charter Township of Warren v. Municipal Finance Com'n, 341 
Mich. 6 07 { 19 54) . But it has refused to interpret the 
same term, "municipal corporation," in a way that would 
defeat its very purpose. See Kent-Ottawa Authority, 
supra, at 172. Whether the Supreme Court of Michigan 
would find that marijuana continues to be a "narcotic 
drug" within the meaning of the provisio is particularly a 
question of state law and policy . 
Where it is unclear, as it is here, whether the 
judgment below rests on independent and adequate state 
grounds, the respect due the States, no less than concerns 
for our own jurisdiction, requires that we ask rather than 
tell the States what they intended. Accordingly, I would 
vacate the judgment and remand for such further 
proceedings as may be appropriate. 
'. ' 
.. ... , 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
MICHIGAN, PETITIONER v. DAVID KERK LONG 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
MICHIGAN 
[May -, 1983] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity 
of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable 
cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police of-
ficer the right "to neutralize the threat of physical harm," id., 
at 24, when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an indi-
vidual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, ex-
pressly address whether such a protective search for weap-
ons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence 
of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent 
David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found 
by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the 
automobile that he was driving. The police searched the 
passenger compartment because they had reason to believe 
that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to 
the officers. We hold that the protective search of the pas-
senger compartment was reasonable under the principles 
articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We 
also examine Long's argument that the decision below rests 
upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we de-
cide in favor of our jurisdiction. 
I 
Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area 
one evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a 
82-256--0PINION 
2 MICHIGAN v. LONG 
car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. 1 The offi-
cers observed the car turning down a side road, where it 
swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to in-
vestigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met the 
deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding from 
the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side of the 
vehicle was left open. 
Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's 
license, but he did not respond. After the request was re-
peated, Long produced his license. Long again failed to re-
spond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle 
registration. After another repeated request, Long, whom 
Howell thought "appeared to be under the influence of some-
thing," 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N. W. 2d 866, 868 (1982), 
turned from the officers and began walking toward the open 
door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both ob-
served a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's 
side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress 
'It is clear, and the respondent concedes, that if the officers had ar-
rested Long for speeding or for driving while intoxicated, they could have 
searched the passenger compartment under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 
454 (1981), and the trunk under United States v. Ross, -- U. S. --
(1982), if they had probable cause to believe that the trunk contained con-
traband. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 41. However, at oral argument, the State 
informed us that while Long could have been arrested for a speeding viola-
tion under Michigan law, he was not arrested because "[a]s a matter of 
practice," police in Michigan do not arrest for speeding violations unless 
"more" is involved. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 6. The officers did issue Long 
an appearance ticket. The petitioner also confirmed that the officers could 
have arrested Long for driving while intoxicated but they "would have to 
go through a process to make a determination as to whether the party is 
intoxicated and then go from that point." ld., at 6. 
The court below treated this case as involving a protective search, and 
not a search justified by probable cause to arrest for speeding, driving 
while intoxicated, or any other offense. Further, the petitioner does not 
argue that if probable cause to arrest exists, but the officers do not actually 
effect the arrest, that the police may nevertheless conduct a search as 
broad as those authorized by Belton and Ross. Accordingly, we do not 
address that issue. 
82--256-0PINION 
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and subjected him to a Terry protective pat-down, which re-
vealed no weapons. 
Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehi-
cle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior 
of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of 
Howell's action was "to search for other weapons." I d., at 
469, 320 N. W. 2d, at 868. The officer noticed that some-
thing was protruding from under the armrest on the front 
seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He 
saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his 
light on the pouch, determined that it contained what ap-
peared to be marijuana. After Deputy Howell showed the 
pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested 
for possession of marijuana. A further search of the interior 
of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more 
contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers de-
cided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the 
trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it ap-
proximately 75 pounds of marijuana. 
The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to 
suppress the marijuana taken from both the interior of the 
car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of posses-
sion of marijuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed 
Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger 
compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry, 
supra, and that the search of the trunk was valid as an inven-
tory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 
(1976). See 94 Mich. App. 338, 288 N. W. 2d 629 (1979). 
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that 
"the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the 
police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in 
this case." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. The 
marijuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court 
below to be the "fruit" of the illegal search of the interior, and 
was also suppressed. 2 
2 Chief Justice Coleman dissented, arguing that Terry authorized the 
' 'I 
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We granted certiorari in this case to consider the impor-
tant question of the authority of a police officer to protect 
himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger 
compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investiga-
tory stop of the occupant of the vehicle. -- U. S. --
(1982). 
II 
Before reaching the merits, we must consider Long's argu-
ment that we are without jurisdiction to decide this case be-
cause the decision below rests on an adequate and independ-
ent state ground. The court below referred twice to the state 
constitution in its opinion, but otherwise relied exclusively on 
federal law. 3 Long argues that the Michigan courts have 
provided greater protection from searches and seizures 
under the state constitution than is afforded under the 
Fourth Amendment, and the references to the state constitu-
tion therefore establish an adequate and independent ground 
for the decision below. 
It is, of course, "incumbent upon this Court ... to ascer-
tain for itself ... whether the asserted non-federal ground 
independently and adequately supports the judgment." 
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 773 (1931). Al-
though we have announced a number of principles in order to 
help us determine whether various forms of references to 
area search, and that the trunk search was a valid inventory search. See 
413 Mich., at 473-480, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870-873. Justice Moody con-
curred in the result on the ground that the trunk search was improper. 
He agreed with Chief Justice Coleman that the interior search was proper 
under Terry. See id., at 480-486, 320 N. W. 2d, 873-875. 
3 On the first occasion, the court merely cited in a footnote both the 
state and federal constitutions. See 413 Mich., at 471, n. 4, 320 N. W. 2d, 
at 869, n. 4. On the second occasion, at the conclusion of the opinion, the 
court stated: "We hold, therefore, that the deputies' search of the vehicle 
was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution." !d., at 472-473, 320 
N. W. 2d, at 870. 
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state law constitute adequate and independent state 
grounds, 4 we openly admit that we have thus far not devel-
oped a satisfying and consistent approach for resolving this 
vexing issue. In some instances, we have taken the strict 
view that if the ground of decision was at all unclear, we 
would dismiss the case. See, e. g., Lynch v. New York, 293 
U. S. 52 (1934). In other instances, we have vacated, see, 
e. g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co, 309 U. S. 551 (1940), or 
continued a case, see e. g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 
(1945), in order to obtain clarification about the nature of a 
state court decision. See also California v. Krivda, 409 
U. S. 33 (1972). In more recent cases, we have ourselves 
examined state law to determine whether state courts have 
used federal law to guide their application of state law or to 
provide the actual basis for the decision that was reached. 
See also Delaware v. Prouse, supra, and Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., supra. In Oregon v. 
Kennedy,-- U. S. --, ----- (1982), we rejected an 
'For example, we have long recognized that "where the judgment of a 
state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other 
non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is 
independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment." 
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). We may review a 
state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an 
available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly 
have relied. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 37, n. 3 (1967). Also, if, 
in our view, the state court "'felt compelled by what it understood to be 
federal constitutional considerations to construe ... its own law in the 
manner that it did,'" then we will not treat a normally adequate state 
ground as independent, and there will be no question about our jurisdic-
tion. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653 (1979) (quoting Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977)). See also 
South Dakota v. Neville, -- U. S. --, --, n. 3 (1983). Finally, 
"where the non-federal ground is so interwoven with the [federal ground] 
as not to be an independent matter, or is not of sufficient breadth to sustain 
the judgment without any decision of the other, our jurisdiction is plain." 
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Company, 243 
u. s. 157, 164 (1917). 
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of an alleged state ground is not apparent from the four cor-
ners of the opinion. We have long recognized that dismissal 
is inappropriate "where there is strong indication ... that 
the federal constitution as judicially construed controlled the 
decision below." National Tea Co., supra, 309 U. S., at 556 
(1940). 
Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as 
avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cor-
nerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there 
is an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely 
because of this respect for state courts, and this desire to 
avoid advisory opinions, that we do not wish to continue to 
decide issues of state law that go beyond the opinion that we 
review, or to require state courts to reconsider cases to clar-
ify the grounds of their decisions. Accordingly, when, as in 
this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primar-
ily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, 
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible 
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we 
will no longer reject the most reasonable explanation that the 
state court decided the case the way it did because it believed 
that federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses 
merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the prece-
dents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear 
by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the fed-
eral cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, 
and do not themselves compel the result that the court has 
reached. In this way, both justice and judicial administration 
will be greatly improved. If the state court decision indi-
cates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on 
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, 
of course, will not undertake to review the decision. This 
approach obviates in most instances the need to examine 
state law in order to decide the nature of the state court deci-
sion, and will at the same time avoid the danger of our ren-
dering advisory opinions. -.1. It also avoids the unsatisfactory 
*There may be certain circumstances in which clarification 
is necessary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from 
taking the appropriate action. 
82-256-0PINION 
8 MICHIGAN v. LONG 
and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify their 
decisions to the satisfaction of this Court. We believe that 
such an approach will provide state judges with a clearer 
opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by 
federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of 
federal law. "It is fundamental that state courts be left free 
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. 
But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudi-
cations by state courts do not stand as barriers to a deter-
mination by this Court of the validity under the federal con-
stitution of state action." National Tea Co., supra, 309 
U. S., at 557. 
Our review of the decision below under this framework 
leaves us unconvinced that it rests upon an independent state 
ground. Apart from its two citations to the state constitu-
tion, the court below relied exclusively on its understanding 
of Terry and other federal cases. Not a single state case was 
cited to support the state court's holding that the search of 
the passenger compartment was unconstitutional. 6 Indeed, 
the court declared that the search in this case was unconstitu-
tional because "[t]he Court of Appeals erroneously applied 
the principles of Terry v. Ohio ... to the search of the inte-
rior of the vehicle in this case." 413 Mich., at 4 71, 320 N. W. 
2d, at 869. The references to the state constitution in no 
way indicate that the decision below rested on grounds in any 
' At oral argument, Long argued that the state court relied on its deci-
sion in People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N. W. 2d 867, cert. denied, 422 
U. S. 1044 (1975). See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 29. However, the court cited 
that case only in the context of a statement that the State did not seek to 
justify the search in this case "by reference to other exceptions to the war-
rant requirement." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869-870 (footnote 
omitted). The court then noted that Reed held that "A warrantless search 
and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the state constitution un-
less shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule." I d., at 472-473, 
n. 8, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870, n. 8. 
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way independent from the state court's interpretation of fed-
eral law. Even if we accept that the Michigan constitution 
has been interpreted to provide independent protection for 
certain rights also secured under the Fourth Amendment, it 
fairly appears in this case that the Michigan Supreme Court 
rested its decision primarily on federal law. 
Rather than dismissing the case, or requiring that the 
state court reconsider its decision on our behalf solely be-
cause of a mere possibility that an adequate and independent 
ground supports the judgment, we find that we have jurisdic-
tion in the absence of a plain statement that the decision 
below rested on an adequate and independent state ground. 
It appears to us that the state court "felt compelled by what 
it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to 
construe . . . its own law in the manner that it did." 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. 8. 
562, 568 (1977). 7 
7 There is nothing unfair about requiring a plain statement of an inde-
pendent state ground in this case. Even if we were to rest our decision on 
an evaluation of the state law relevant to Long's claim, as we have some-
times done in the past, our understanding of Michigan law would also result 
in our finding that we have jurisdiction to decide this case. Under state 
search and seizure law, a "higher standard" is imposed under art. 1, § 11 of 
the 1963 Michigan Constitution. See People v. Secrist, 413 Mich. 521, 525, 
321 N. W. 2d 368, 369 (1982). If, however, the item seized is, inter alia, a 
"narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any 
dwelling house in this state," art I, § 11 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, 
then the seizure is governed by a standard identical to that imposed by the 
Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 216 N. W. 
2d 770, 775 (1974). . 
Long argues that under the current Michigan Public Health Code 
§ 333.7107, the definition of a "narcotic" does not include marijuana. The 
difficulty with this argument is that Long fails to cite any authority for the 
proposition that the term "narcotic" as used in the Michigan constitution is 
dependent on current statutory definitions of that term. Indeed, it ap-
pears that just the opposite is true. The Michigan Supreme Court has 
held that constitutional provisions are presumed "to be interpreted in ac-
cordance with existing laws and legal usages of the time" of the passage of 
82-25&--0PINION 
10 MICHIGAN v. LONG 
III 
The court below held, and respondent Long contends, that 
Deputy Howell's entry into the vehicle cannot be justified 
under the principles set forth in Terry because Terry author-
ized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of 
criminal activity rather than a search of an area. 413 Mich., 
at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869 (footnote omitted). Brief for 
Respondent, p. 10. Although Terry did involve the protec-
tive frisk of a person, we believe that the police action in this 
case is justified by the principles that we have already estab-
lished in Terry and other cases. 
In Terry, the Court examined the validity of a "stop and 
frisk" in the absence of probable cause and a warrant. The 
police officer in Terry detained several suspects to ascertain 
their identities after the officer had observed the suspects for 
a brief period of time and formed the conclusion that they 
the provision. Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 169, 92 
N. W. 2d 492, 497 (1958). If the state legislature were able to change the 
interpretation of a constitutional provision by statute, then the legislature 
would have "the power of outright repeal of a duly-voted constitutional 
provision." Ibid. Applying these principles, the Michigan courts have 
held that a statute passed subsequent to the applicable state constitutional 
provision is not relevant for interpreting its constitution, and that a defini-
tion in a legislative act pertains only to that act. Jones v. City of Ypsi-
lanti, 26 Mich. App. 574, 182 N. W. 2d 795 (1970). See also Walber v. 
Wayne Circuit Judge, 2 Mich. App. 145, 138 N. W. 2d 772 (1966), affd, 381 
Mich. 138, 160 N. W. 2d 876 (1968). At the time that the 1963 Michigan 
Constitution was enacted, it is clear that marijuana was considered a nar-
cotic drug. See 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 266, § 1. Indeed, it appears 
that marijuana was considered a narcotic drug in Michigan until1978, when 
it was removed from the narcotic classification. We would conclude that 
the seizure of marijuana in Michigan is not subject to analysis under any 
"higher standard" that may be imposed on the seizure of other items. In 
the light of our holding in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, that an interpreta-
tion of state law in our view compelled by federal constitutional consider-
ations is not an independent state ground, we would have jurisdiction to 
decide the case. 
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were about to engage in criminal activity. Because the offi-
cer feared that the suspects were armed, he patted down the 
outside of the suspects' clothing and discovered two revolv-
ers. 
Examining the reasonableness of the officer's conduct in 
Terry, 8 we held that there is "'no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or 
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] en-
tails."' 392 U. S., at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U. S. 523, 536--537 (1967)). Although the conduct 
of the officer in Terry involved a "severe, though brief, intru-
sion upon cherished personal security," 392 U. S., at 24-25, 
we found that the conduct was reasonable when we weighed 
the interest of the individual against the legitimate interest 
in "crime detection and prevention," id., at 23, and the "need 
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other 
prospective victims of violence in situations where they lack 
probable cause for an arrest." I d., at 24. When the officer 
has a reasonable belief "that the individual whose suspicious 
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and pres-
ently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to 
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take 
8 Although we did not in any way weaken the warrant requirement, we 
acknowledged that the typical "stop and frisk" situation involves "an entire 
rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-
the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not 
been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant pro-
cedure. Instead, the conduct in this case must be tested by the Fourth 
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures." 392 U. S., at 20 (footnote omitted). We have emphasized that 
the propriety of a Terry stop and frisk is to be judged according to whether 
the officer acted as a "reasonably prudent man" in deciding that the intru-
sion was justified. Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 27. "A brief stop of a sus-
picious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the sta-
tus quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most 
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Adams 
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972). 
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necessary measures to determine whether the person is in 
fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physi-
cal harm." Ibid. 
Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent 
pat-down search of a person, we were careful to note that 
"[ w ]e need not develop at length in this case, however, the 
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a pro-
tective search and seizure for weapons. These limitations 
will have to be developed in the concrete factual circum-
stances of individual cases." !d. at 29. Contrary to Long's 
view, Terry did not restrict the preventative search to the 
person of the detained suspect. 9 
In two cases in which we applied Terry to specific factual 
situations, we recognized that investigative detentions in-
volving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with dan-
ger to police officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U. S. 106 (1972), we held that police may order persons out of 
an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may 
frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief 
that they are armed and dangerous. Our decision rested in 
part on the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he ap-
proaches a person seated in an automobile." !d., at 110. In 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), we held that the 
police, acting on an informant's tip, may reach into the pas-
senger compartment of an automobile to remove a gun from a 
driver's waistband even where the gun was not apparent to 
police from outside the car and the police knew of its exist-
9 As Chief Justice Coleman noted in her dissenting opinion in the 
present case: 
"The opinion in TemJ authorized the frisking of an overcoat worn by de-
fendant because that was the issue presented by the facts. One could rea-
sonably conclude that a different result would not have been constitution-
ally required if the overcoat had been carried, folded over the forearm, 
rather than worn. The constitutional principles in Terry would still 
control." 
413 Mich., at 475-476, 320 N. W. 2d, at 871 (Coleman, C. J., dissenting). 
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ence only because of the tip. Again, our decision rested in 
part on our view of the danger presented to police officers in 
"traffic stop" and automobile situations. 10 
Finally, we have also expressly recognized that suspects 
may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access 
to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed. 
In the Term following Terry, we decided Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U. 8. 752 (1969), which involved the limitations im-
posed on police authority to conduct a search incident to a 
valid arrest. Relying explicitly on Terry, we held that when 
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his imme-
diate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from 
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or de-
structible evidence." I d., at 763. We reasoned that "[a] 
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested 
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed 
in the clothing of the person arrested." Ibid. In New York 
v. Belton, 453 U. 8. 454 (1981), we determined that the lower 
courts "have found no workable definition of 'the area within 
the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area argu-
ably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is 
its recent occupant." Id., at 460. In order to provide a 
"workable rule," ibid., we held that "articles inside the rela-
tively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, 
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order 
to grab a weapon' .... " Ibid. (quoting Chimel, supra, 395 
U. 8., at 763). We also held that the police may examine the 
contents of any open or closed container found within the pas-
10 "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings oc-
curred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. 
Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 
J.Crim.L.C.& P.S. 93 (1963)." Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U. S., at 
148, n. 3. 
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senger compartment, "for if the passenger compartment is 
within the reach of the arrestee, so will containers in it be 
within his reach." 453 U. S., at 460. (footnote omitted). 
See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702 (1981). 
Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and 
others can justify protective searches when police have a rea-
sonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside 
encounters between police and suspects are especially haz-
ardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence 
of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These princi-
ples compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in 
which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the 
police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers 
to believe that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may 
gain immediate control of weapons. u See Terry, 392 U. S., 
"We stress that our decision does not mean that the police may conduct 
automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop, although 
the "bright line" that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search 
whenever officers effect a custodial arrest. An additional interest exists 
in the arrest context, i. e., preservation of evidence, and this justifies an 
"automatic" search. However, that additional interest does not exist in 
the Terry context. A Terry search, "unlike a search without a warrant 
incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disap-
pearance or destruction of evidence of crime .... The sole justification of 
the search ... is the protection of police officers and others nearby .... " 
392 U. S., at 29. What we borrow now from Chimel and Belton is merely 
the recognition that part of the reason to allow area searches incident to an 
arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be armed, may be able to 
gain access to weapons to injure officers or others nearby, or otherwise to 
hinder legitimate police activity. This recognition applies as well in the 
Terry context. However, because the interest in collecting and preserv-
ing evidence is not present in the Terry context, we require that officers 
who conduct area searches during investigative detentions must do so only 
when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry. 
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at 21. "The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or those of others was in danger." ld., at 27. If a 
suspect is "dangerous," he is no less dangerous simply be-
cause he is not arrested. If, while conducting a legitimate 
Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer 
should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he 
clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the 
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such 
circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
465 (1971); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978); 
Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,--,-- (1983) (plurality 
opinion by REHNQUIST, J., and opinion concurring in the 
judgment by POWELL, J.). 
The circumstances of this case clearly justified Deputies 
Howell and Lewis in their reasonable belief that Long posed 
a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle. The 
hour was late and the area rural. Long was driving his auto-
mobile at excessive speed, and his car swerved into a ditch. 
The officers had to repeat their questions to Long, who ap-
peared to be "under the influence" of some intoxicant. The 
intrusion was "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which 
justifi[ed] its initiation." Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 26. 
Long was not frisked until the officers observed that there 
was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long 
was about to reenter. The subsequent search of the car was 
restricted to those areas to which Long would generally have 
immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. The trial 
court determined that the leather pouch containing mari-
juana could have contained a weapon. App. 64a. 12 
"The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amend-
ment is always 'the reasonableness in all circumstances of the 
particular government invasion of a citizen's personal secu-
12 Of course, our analysis would apply to justify the search of Long's per-
son that was conducted by the officers after the discovery of the knife. 
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rity."' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 434 U. S., at 
10~109 (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 19). In this 
case, the officers did not act unreasonably in not permitting 
Long to reenter his automobile before taking preventive 
measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within 
Long's immediate grasp. Therefore, the balancing required 
by Terry clearly weighs in favor of permitting the police to 
conduct an area search to uncover weapons, as long as they 
possess an articulable belief that the suspect is potentially 
dangerous. 
The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it 
was not reasonable for the officers to believe that Long could 
injure them, because he was effectively under their control 
during the investigative stop and could not get access to any 
weapons that might have been located in the automobile. See 
413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. This reasoning is 
mistaken in several respects. During any investigative de-
tention, the suspect is "in the control" of the officers in the 
sense that he "may be briefly detained against his will . . .. " 
Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Just 
as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the 
brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing andre-
trieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long's position 
break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from 
his automobile. See United States v. Rainone, 586 F. 2d 
1132, 1134 (CA 7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 980 (1979). In 
addition, if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be 
permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have ac-
cess to any weapons inside. United States v. Powless, 546 
F. 2d 792, 795-796 (CAS), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 910 (1977). 
Or, as here, the suspect may be permitted to reenter the ve-
hicle before the Terry investigation is over, and again, may 
have access to weapons. In any event, we stress that a 
Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, in-
volves a police investigation "at close range," Terry, supra, 
392 U. S., at 24, when the officer remains particularly vul-
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nerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been 
effected, and the officer must make a "quick decision as to 
how to protect himself and others from possible danger." 
I d., at 28. In such circumstances, we have not required that 
officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order 
to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter. 13 
IV 
The trial court and the court of appeals upheld the search 
of the trunk as a valid inventory search under this Court's de-
cision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976). 
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address this holding, 
and instead suppressed the marijuana taken from the trunk 
as a fruit of the illegal search of the interior of the automo-
bile. Our holding that the initial search was justified under 
Terry makes it necessary to determine whether the trunk 
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
However, we decline to address this question because it was 
not passed upon by the Michigan Supreme Court, whose deci-
'
3 Long makes a number of arguments concerning the invalidity of the 
search of the passenger compartment. The thrust of these arguments is 
that Terry searches are limited in scope and that an area search is funda-
mentally inconsistent with this limited scope. We have recognized that 
Terry searches are limited insofar as they may not be conducted in the ab-
sence of an articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see e. g., 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 65 (1968), and that they are protective 
in nature and limited to weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 
93-94 (1979). However, neither of these concerns is violated by our deci-
sion. To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons, 
the officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially 
dangerous. 
Long also argues that there cannot be a legitimate Terry search based on 
the discovery of the hunting knife because Long possessed that weapon le-
gally. See Brief for Respondent, p. 17. Assuming arguendo that Long 
possessed the knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view that the 
validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon is possessed in 
accordance with state law. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 
(1972). 
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sion we review in this case. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 
394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969). We remand this issue to the court 
below, to enable it to determine whether the trunk search 
was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions 
of this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, -- U. S. 
--, (1982). 14 
v 
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
14 Long suggests that the trunk search is invalid under state law. See 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 41, 43-44. The Michigan Supreme Court is, of course, 
free to determine the validity of that search under state law. 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity 
of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable 
cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police of-
ficer the right "to neutralize the threat of physical harm," id., 
at 24, when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an indi-
vidual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, ex-
pressly address whether such a protective search for weap-
ons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence 
of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent 
David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found 
by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the 
automobile that he was driving. The police searched the 
passenger compartment because they had reason to believe 
that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to 
the officers. We hold that the protective search of the pas-
senger compartment was reasonable under the principles 
articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We 
also examine Long's argument that the decision below rests 
upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we de-
cide in favor of our jurisdiction. 
I 
Deputies Howell and Lewis \vere on patrol in a rural area 
one evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a 
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car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. 1 The offi-
cers observed the car turning down a side road, where it 
swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to in-
vestigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met the 
deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding from 
the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side of the 
vehicle was left open. 
Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's 
license, but he did not respond. After the request was re-
peated, Long produced his license. Long again failed tore-
spond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle 
registration. After another repeated request, Long, whom 
Howell thought "appeared to be under the influence of some-
thing," 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N. W. 2d 866, 868 (1982), 
turned from the officers and began walking toward the open 
door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both ob-
served a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's 
side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress 
'It is clear, and the respondent concedes, that if the officers had ar-
rested Long for speeding or for driving while intoxicated, they could have 
searched the passenger compartment under N ew York v. Belton , 453 U. S. 
454 (1981), and the trunk under United States v. Ross , -- U. S. --
(1982), if they had probable cause to believe that the trunk contained con-
traband. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 41. However, at oral argument, the State 
informed us that while Long could have been arrested for a speeding viola-
tion under Michigan law, he was not arrested because "[a]s a matter of 
practice," police in Michigan do not arrest for speeding violations unless 
"more" is involved. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 6. The officers did issue Long 
an appearance ticket. The petitioner also confirmed that the officers could 
have arrested Long for driving while intoxicated but they "would have to 
go through a process to make a determination as to whether the party is 
intoxicated and then go from that point." ld. , at 6. 
The court below treated this case as involving a protective search, and 
not a search justified by probable cause to arrest for speeding, driving 
while intoxicated, or any other offense. Further, the petitioner does not 
argue that if probable cause to arrest exists, but the officers do not actually 
effect the arrest, that the police may nevertheless conduct a search as 
broad as those authorized by Belton and Ross. Accordingly, we do not 
address that issue. 
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and subjected him to a Terry protective pat-down, which re-
vealed no weapons. 
Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehi-
cle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior 
of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of 
Howell's action was "to search for other weapons." I d., at 
469, 320 N. W. 2d, at 868. The officer noticed that some-
thing was protruding from under the armrest on the front 
seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He 
saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his 
light on the pouch, determined that it contained what ap-
peared to be marijuana. After Deputy Howell showed the 
pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested 
for possession of marijuana. A further search of the interior 
of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more 
contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers de-
cided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the 
trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it ap-
proximately 75 pounds of marijuana. 
The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to 
suppress the marijuana taken from both the interior of the 
car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of posses-
sion of marijuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed 
Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger 
compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry, 
supra, and that the search of the trunk was valid as an inven-
tory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 
(1976). See 94 Mich. App. 338, 288 N. W. 2d 629 (1979). 
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that 
"the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the 
police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in 
this case." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. The 
marijuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court 
below to be the "fruit" of the illegal search of the interior, and 
was also suppressed. 2 
2 Chief Justice Coleman dissented, arguing that Ten-y authorized the 
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We granted certiorari in this case to consider the impor-
tant question of the authority of a police officer to protect 
himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger 
compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investiga-
tory stop of the occupant of the vehicle. -- U. S. --
(1982). 
II 
Before reaching the merits, we must consider Long's argu-
ment that we are without jurisdiction to decide this case be-
cause the decision below rests on an adequate and independ-
ent state ground. The court below referred twice to the state 
constitution in its opinion, but otherwise relied exclusively on 
federal law. 3 Long argues that the Michigan courts have 
provided greater protection from searches and seizures 
under the state constitution than is afforded under the 
Fourth Amendment, and the references to the state constitu-
tion therefore establish an adequate and independent ground 
for the decision below. 
It is, of course, "incumbent upon this Court ... to ascer-
tain for itself ... whether the asserted non-federal ground 
independently and adequately supports the judgment." 
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 773 (1931). Al-
though we have announced a number of principles in order to 
help us determine whether various forms of references to 
area search, and that the trunk search was a valid inventory search. See 
413 Mich., at 473-480, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870-873. Justice Moody con-
curred in the result on the ground that the trunk search was improper. 
He agreed with Chief Justice Coleman that the interior search was proper 
under Terry. See id., at 480-486, 320 N. W. 2d, 873-875. 
3 On the first occasion, the court merely cited in a footnote both the 
state and federal constitutions. See 413 Mich., at 471 , n. 4, 320 N. W. 2d, 
at 869, n. 4. On the second occasion, at the conclusion of the opinion, the 
court stated: "We hold , therefore , that the deputies' search of the vehicle 
was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution." /d., at 472-473, 320 
N. W. 2d, at 870. 
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state law constitute adequate and independent state 
grounds, 4 we openly admit that we have thus far not devel-
oped a satisfying and consistent approach for resolving this 
vexing issue. In some instances, we have taken the strict 
view that if the ground of decision was at all unclear, we 
would dismiss the case. See, e. g., Lynch v. New York, 293 
U. S. 52 (1934). In other instances, we have vacated, see, 
e. g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co, 309 U. S. 551 (1940), or 
continued a case, see e. g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 
(1945), in order to obtain clarification about the nature of a 
state court decision. See also California v. Krivda, 409 
U. S. 33 (1972). In more recent cases, we have ourselves 
examined state law to determine whether state courts have 
used federal law to guide their application of state law or to 
provide the actual basis for the decision that was reached. 
See also Delaware v. Prouse, supra, and Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., supra. In Oregon v. 
Kennedy,-- U. S. --, ----- (1982), we rejected an 
• For example, we have long recognized that "where the judgment of a 
state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other 
non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is 
independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment." 
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). We may review a 
state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an 
available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly 
have relied. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 37, n. 3 (1967). Also, if, 
in our view, the state court "'felt compelled by what it understood to be 
federal constitutional considerations to construe ... its own law in the 
manner that it did, ' " then we will not treat a normally adequate state 
ground as independent, and there will be no question about our jurisdic-
tion. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653 (1979) (quoting Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977)). See also 
South Dakota v. Neville, -- U. S. --, --, n. 3 (1983). Finally, 
"where the non-federal ground is so interwoven with the [federal ground] 
as not to be an independent matter, or is not of sufficient breadth to sustain 
the judgment without any decision of the other, our jurisdiction is plain." 
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Company, 243 
u. s. 157, 164 (1917). 
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of an alleged state ground is not apparent from the four cor-
ners of the opinion. We have long recognized that dismissal 
is inappropriate "where there is strong indication ... that 
the federal constitution as judicially construed controlled the 
decision below." National Tea Co., supra, 309 U. S., at 556 
(1940). 
Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as 
avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cor-
nerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there 
is an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely 
because of this respect for state courts, and this desire to 
avoid advisory opinions, that we do not wish to continue to 
decide issues of state law that go beyond the opinion that we 
review, or to require state courts to reconsider cases to clar-
ify the grounds of their decisions. Accordingly, when, as in 
this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primar-
ily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, 
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible 
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we 
will no longer reject the most reasonable explanation that the 
state court decided the case the way it did because it believed 
that federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses 
merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the prece-
dents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear 
by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the fed-
eral cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, 
and do not themselves compel the result that the court has 
reached. In this way, both justice and judicial administration 
will be greatly improved. If the state court decision indi-
cates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on 
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, 
of course, will not undertake to review the decision. This 
approach obviates in most instances the need to examine 
state law in order to decide the nature of the state court deci-
sion, and will at the same time avoid the danger of our ren-
dering advisory opinions .. ,~. It also avoids the unsatisfactory 
*There may be certain circumstances in which clarification 
is necessary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from 
taking the appropriate action. 
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and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify their 
decisions to the satisfaction of this Court. We believe that 
such an approach will provide state judges with a clearer 
opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by 
federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of 
federal law. "It is fundamental that state courts be left free 
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. 
But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudi-
cations by state courts do not stand as barriers to a deter-
mination by this Court of the validity under the federal con-
stitution of state action." National Tea Co., supra, 309 
U. S., at 557. 
Our review of the decision below under this framework 
leaves us unconvinced that it rests upon an independent state 
ground. Apart from its two citations to the state constitu-
tion, the court below relied exclusively on its understanding 
of Terry and other federal cases. Not a single state case was 
cited to support the state court's holding that the search of 
the passenger compartment was unconstitutional. 6 Indeed, 
the court declared that the search in this case was unconstitu-
tional because "[t]he Court of Appeals erroneously applied 
the principles of Terry v. Ohio ... to the search of the inte-
rior of the vehicle in this case." 413 Mich. , at 471, 320 N. W. 
2d, at 869. The references to the state constitution in no 
way indicate that the decision below rested on grounds in any 
6 At oral argument, Long argued that the state court relied on its deci-
sion in People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N. W. 2d 867, cert. denied, 422 
U. S. 1044 (1975). See Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 29. However, the court cited 
that case only in the context of a statement that the State did not seek to 
justify the search in this case "by reference to other exceptions to the war-
rant requirement. " 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869--870 (footnote 
omitted). The court then noted that Reed held that "A warrantless search 
and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the state constitution un-
less shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule." /d. , at 472-473, 
n. 8, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870, n. 8. 
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way independent from the state court's interpretation of fed-
eral law. Even if we accept that the Michigan constitution 
has been interpreted to provide independent protection for 
certain rights also secured under the Fourth Amendment, it 
fairly appears in this case that the Michigan Supreme Court 
rested its decision primarily on federal law. 
Rather than dismissing the case, or requiring that the 
state court reconsider its decision on our behalf solely be-
cause of a mere possibility that an adequate and independent 
ground supports the judgment, we find that we have jurisdic-
tion in the absence of a plain statement that the decision 
below rested on an adequate and independent state ground. 
It appears to us that the state court "felt compelled by what 
it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to 
construe . . . its own law in the manner that it did." 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 
562, 568 (1977). 7 
7 There is nothing unfair about requiring a plain statement of an inde-
pendent state ground in this case. Even if we were to rest our decision on 
an evaluation of the state law relevant to Long's claim, as we have some-
times done in the past, our understanding of Michigan law would also result 
in our finding that we have jurisdiction to decide this case. Under state 
search and seizure law, a "higher standard" is imposed under art. 1, § 11 of 
the 1963 Michigan Constitution. See People v. Secrist, 413 Mich. 521, 525, 
321 N. W. 2d 368, 369 (1982). If, however, the item seized is, inter alia, a 
"narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any 
dwelling house in this state," art 1, § 11 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, 
then the seizure is governed by a standard identical to that imposed by the 
Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 216 N. W. 
2d 770, 775 (1974). 
Long argues that under the current Michigan Public Health Code 
§ 333.7107, the definition of a "narcotic" does not include marijuana. The 
difficulty with this argument is that Long fails to cite any authority for the 
proposition that the term "narcotic" as used in the Michigan constitution is 
dependent on current statutory definitions of that term. Indeed, it ap-
pears that just the opposite is true. The Michigan Supreme Court has 
held that constitutional provisions are presumed "to be interpreted in ac-
cordance with existing laws and legal usages of the time" of the passage of 
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III 
The court below held, and respondent Long contends, that 
Deputy Howell's entry into the vehicle cannot be justified 
under the principles set forth in Terry because Terry author-
ized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of 
criminal activity rather than a search of an area. 413 Mich., 
at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869 (footnote omitted). Brief for 
Respondent, p. 10. Although Terry did involve the protec-
tive frisk of a person, we believe that the police action in this 
case is justified by the principles that we have already estab-
lished in Terry and other cases. 
In Terry, the Court examined the validity of a "stop and 
frisk" in the absence of probable cause and a warrant. The 
police officer in Terry detained several suspects to ascertain 
their identities after the officer had observed the suspects for 
a brief period of time and formed the conclusion that they 
the provision. Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 169, 92 
N. W. 2d 492, 497 (1958). If the state legislature were able to change the 
interpretation of a constitutional provision by statute, then the legislature 
would have "the power of outright repeal of a duly-voted constitutional 
provision." Ibid. Applying these principles, the Michigan courts have 
held that a statute passed subsequent to the applicable state constitutional 
provision is not relevant for interpreting its constitution, and that a defini-
tion in a legislative act pertains only to that act. Jones v. City of Ypsi-
lanti, 26 Mich. App. 574, 182 N. W. 2d 795 (1970). See also Walber v. 
Wayne Circuit Judge, 2 Mich. App. 145, 138 N. W. 2d 772 (1966), affd, 381 
Mich. 138, 160 N. W. 2d 876 (1968). At the time that the 1963 Michigan 
Constitution was enacted, it is clear that marijuana was considered a nar-
cotic drug. See 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 266, § 1. Indeed, it appears 
that marijuana was considered a narcotic drug in Michigan until1978, when 
it was removed from the narcotic classification. We would conclude that 
the seizure of marijuana in Michigan is not subject to analysis under any 
"higher standard" that may be imposed on the seizure of other items. In 
the light of our holding in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, that an interpreta-
tion of state law in our view compelled by federal constitutional consider-
ations is not an independent state ground, we would have jurisdiction to 
decide the case. 
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were about to engage in criminal activity. Because the offi-
cer feared that the suspects were armed, he patted down the 
outside of the suspects' clothing and discovered two revolv-
ers. 
Examining the reasonableness of the officer's conduct in 
Terry, 8 we held that there is "'no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or 
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] en-
tails."' 392 U. S., at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U. S. 523, 53(H)37 (1967)). Although the conduct 
of the officer in Terry involved a "severe, though brief, intru-
sion upon cherished personal security," 392 U. S., at 24-25, 
we found that the conduct was reasonable when we weighed 
the interest of the individual against the legitimate interest 
in "crime detection and prevention," id., at 23, and the "need 
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other 
prospective victims of violence in situations where they lack 
probable cause for an arrest." I d., at 24. When the officer 
has a reasonable belief "that the individual whose suspicious 
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and pres-
ently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to 
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take 
8 Although we did not in any way weaken the warrant requirement, we 
acknowledged that the typical "stop and frisk" situation involves "an entire 
rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-
the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not 
been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant pro-
cedure. Instead, the conduct in this case must be tested by the Fourth 
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures." 392 U. S., at 20 (footnote omitted). We have emphasized that 
the propriety of a Terry stop and frisk is to be judged according to whether 
the officer acted as a "reasonably prudent man" in deciding that the intru-
sion was justified. Terry, supra, 392 U. S. , at 27. "A brief stop of a sus-
picious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the sta-
tus quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most 
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. " Adams 
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972). 
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necessary measures to determine whether the person is in 
fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physi-
cal harm." Ibid. 
Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent 
pat-down search of a person, we were careful to note that 
"[w]e need not develop at length in this case, however, the 
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a pro-
tective search and seizure for weapons. These limitations 
will have to be developed in the concrete factual circum-
stances of individual cases." !d. at 29. Contrary to Long's 
view, Terry did not restrict the preventative search to the 
person of the detained suspect. 9 
In two cases in which we applied Terry to specific factual 
situations, we recognized that investigative detentions in-
volving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with dan-
ger to police officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U. S. 106 (1972), we held that police may order persons out of 
an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may 
frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief 
that they are armed and dangerous. Our decision rested in 
part on the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he ap-
proaches a person seated in an automobile." ld. , at 110. In 
Adams v. Williams , 407 U. S. 143 (1972), we held that the 
police, acting on an informant's tip, may reach into the pas-
senger compartment of an automobile to remove a gun from a 
driver's waistband even where the gun was not apparent to 
police from outside the car and the police knew of its exist-
• As Chief Justice Coleman noted in her dissenting opinion in the 
present case: 
"The opinion in Terry authorized the frisking of an overcoat worn by de-
fendant because that was the issue presented by the facts. One could rea-
sonably conclude that a different result would not have been constitution-
ally required if the overcoat had been carried, folded over the forearm, 
rather than worn. The constitutional principles in Terry would still 
control. " 
413 Mich., at 475-476, 320 N. W. 2d, at 871 (Coleman, C. J. , dissenting). 
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ence only because of the tip. Again, our decision rested in 
part on our view of the danger presented to police officers in 
"traffic stop" and automobile situations. 10 
Finally, we have also expressly recognized that suspects 
may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access 
to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed. 
In the Term following Terry, we decided Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), which involved the limitations im-
posed on police authority to conduct a search incident to a 
valid arrest. Relying explicitly on Terry, we held that when 
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his imme-
diate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from 
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or de-
structible evidence." I d., at 763. We reasoned that "[a] 
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested 
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed 
in the clothing of the person arrested." Ibid. In New York 
v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), we determined that the lower 
courts "have found no workable definition of 'the area within 
the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area argu-
ably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is 
its recent occupant." I d., at 460. In order to provide a 
"workable rule," ibid., we held that "articles inside the rela-
tively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, 
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order 
to grab a weapon' .... " Ibid. (quoting Chimel, supra, 395 
U. S., at 763). We also held that the police may examine the 
contents of any open or closed container found within the pas-
'
0 "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings oc-
curred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. 
Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 
J.Crim.L.C.& P.S. 93 (1963) ." Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U. S., at 
148, n. 3. 
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senger compartment, "for if the passenger compartment is 
within the reach of the arrestee, so will containers in it be 
within his reach." 453 U. S., at 460. (footnote omitted). 
See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702 (1981). 
Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and 
others can justify protective searches when police have a rea-
sonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside 
encounters between police and suspects are especially haz-
ardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence 
of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These princi-
ples compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in 
which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the 
police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers 
to believe that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may 
gain immediate control of weapons. 11 See Terry, 392 U. S. , 
11 We stress that our decision does not mean that the police may conduct 
automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop, although 
the "bright line" that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search 
whenever officers effect a custodial arrest. An additional interest exists 
in the arrest context, i. e. , preservation of evidence, and this justifies an 
"automatic" search. However, that additional interest does not exist in 
the Terry context. A Terry search, "unlike a search without a warrant 
incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disap-
pearance or destruction of evidence of crime . .. . The sole justification of 
the search ... is the protection of police officers and others nearby .. .. " 
392 U. S., at 29. What we borrow now from Chimel and Belton is merely 
the recognition that part of the reason to allow area searches incident to an 
arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be armed, may be able to 
gain access to weapons to injure officers or others nearby, or otherwise to 
hinder legitimate police activity. This recognition applies as well in the 
Terry context. However, because the interest in collecting and preserv-
ing evidence is not present in the Terry context, we require that officers 
who conduct area searches during investigative detentions must do so only 
when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry. 
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at 21. "The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or those of others was in danger." I d., at 27. If a 
suspect is "dangerous," he is no less dangerous simply be-
cause he is not arrested. If, while conducting a legitimate 
Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer 
should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he 
clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the 
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such 
circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
465 (1971); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978); 
Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,--,-- (1983) (plurality 
opinion by REHNQUIST, J., and opinion concurring in the 
judgment by POWELL, J.). 
The circumstances of this case clearly justified Deputies 
Howell and Lewis in their reasonable belief that Long posed 
a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle. The 
hour was late and the area rural. Long was driving his auto-
mobile at excessive speed, and his car swerved into a ditch. 
The officers had to repeat their questions to Long, who ap-
peared to be "under the influence" of some intoxicant. The 
intrusion was "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which 
justifi[ed] its initiation." Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 26. 
Long was not frisked until the officers observed that there 
was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long 
was about to reenter. The subsequent search of the car was 
restricted to those areas to which Long would generally have 
immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. The trial 
court determined that the leather pouch containing mari-
juana could have contained a weapon. App. 64a. 12 
"The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amend-
ment is always 'the reasonableness in all circumstances of the 
particular government invasion of a citizen's personal secu-
12 Of course, our analysis would apply to justify the search of Long's per-
son that was conducted by the officers after the discovery of the knife. 
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rity."' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 434 U. S., at 
108-109 (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 19). In this 
case, the officers did not act unreasonably in not permitting 
Long to reenter his automobile before taking preventive 
measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within 
Long's immediate grasp. Therefore, the balancing required 
by Terry clearly weighs in favor of permitting the police to 
conduct an area search to uncover weapons, as long as they 
possess an articulable belief that the suspect is potentially 
dangerous. 
The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it 
was not reasonable for the officers to believe that Long could 
injure them, because he was effectively under their control 
during the investigative stop and could not get access to any 
weapons that might have been located in the automobile. See 
413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. This reasoning is 
mistaken in several respects. During any investigative de-
tention, the suspect is "in the control" of the officers in the 
sense that he "may be briefly detained against his will . . . . " 
Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Just 
as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the 
brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing andre-
trieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long's position 
break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from 
his automobile. See United States v. Rainone, 586 F. 2d 
1132, 1134 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 980 (1979). In 
addition, if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be 
permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have ac-
cess to any weapons inside. United States v. Powless, 546 
F. 2d 792, 795-796 (CA8), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 910 (1977). 
Or, as here, the suspect may be permitted to reenter the ve-
hicle before the Terry investigation is over, and again, may 
have access to weapons. In any event, we stress that a 
Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, in-
volves a police investigation "at close range," Terry, supra, 
392 U. S., at 24, when the officer remains particularly vul-
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nerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been 
effected, and the officer must make a "quick decision as to 
how to protect himself and others from possible danger." 
Id., at 28. In such circumstances, we have not required that 
officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order 
to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter. 13 
IV 
The trial court and the court of appeals upheld the search 
of the trunk as a valid inventory search under this Court's de-
cision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976). 
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address this holding, 
and instead suppressed the marijuana taken from the trunk 
as a fruit of the illegal search of the interior of the automo-
bile. Our holding that the initial search was justified under 
Terry makes it necessary to determine whether the trunk 
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
However, we decline to address this question because it was 
not passed upon by the Michigan Supreme Court, whose deci-
'
3 Long makes a number of arguments concerning the invalidity of the 
search of the passenger compartment. The thrust of these arguments is 
that Terry searches are limited in scope and that an area search is funda-
mentally inconsistent with this limited scope. We have recognized that 
Terry searches are limited insofar as they may not be conducted in the ab-
sence of an articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see e. g., 
Sibron v. New York , 392 U. S. 40, 65 (1968), and that they are protective 
in nature and limited to weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 
9~94 (1979). However, neither of these concerns is violated by our deci-
sion. To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons, 
the officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially 
dangerous. 
Long also argues that there cannot be a legitimate Terry search based on 
the discovery of the hunting knife because Long possessed that weapon le-
gally. See Brief for Respondent, p. 17. Assuming arguendo that Long 
possessed the knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view that the 
validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon is possessed in 
accordance with state law. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 
(1972). 
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sion we review in this case. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 
394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969). We remand this issue to the court 
below, to enable it to determine whether the trunk search 
was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions 
of this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross,-- U. S. 
--, (1982). 14 
v 
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
14 Long suggests that the trunk search is invalid under state law. See 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 41, 4344. The Michigan Supreme Court is, of course, 
free to determine the validity of that search under state law. 
drk 05/13/83 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 82-256, Michigan v. Long 
When a state court decision contains references to both 
state and federal law, Justice O'Connor's opinion establishes the 
following "plain statement" rule for determining this Court's 
jurisdiction: if a state court decision "fairly appears to rest 
federal law," the Court will presume that it has 
jurisdiction unless the state court has indicated clearly and 
expressly that its judgment rests on independent and adequate state 
As a working princi£le, the rule appears salutary. By 
-----------------
requiring a clear statement that the opinion rests on independent 
and adequate state grounds, it keeps this Court from having to 
inquire into state law to determine its jurisdiction. And it may 
prevent state judges from relying on federal law, but insulating 
their decision from review by including a brief reference to state 
law. Thus, it seems that practical considerations counsel in favor 
of adopting such a rule. 
But there are theoretical problems with such a rule, and 
-::::-
for the following reasons I would recommend against joining Justice 
O'Connor's plain statement rule. It is well established that when a 
state court's judgment rests on independent and adequate state 
grounds this Court has no jurisdiction to review the state court's 
decision. Because the presence of state grounds raises 
2. 
jurisdictional questions, the Court previously has been reluctant to 
'l ~\ 
decide cases where there is a substantial possiblity that the state 
judgment does not rest on federal grounds. In such cases, the Court 
either has reviewed state law, declined jurisdiction or remanded to 
the States to allow them to explain the grounds on which their 
decisions rest. See, e.g., California v. Krivda, 409 u.s. 33 
(1972): Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 u.s. 551 (1940): Herb v. 
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). 
Justice O'Connors' approach departs from this established 
precedent. She does not examine the cases to see whether the 
decision below rests on federal or state law. Rather, she resolves 
any doubts in favor of the Court's jurisdiction and thus causes the 
Court to exercise its power where it may have none. The proposed 
plain statement rule seems to me a departure from the Court's 
constant recognition that because it is a court of limited 
jurisdiction it will be reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction when 
it is in doubt. 
A s cond ith the rule announced by the opinion 
is that it seems fa1rly intrusive on state court authority. The 
state courts are under no obligation to keep state and federal law 
separate. As Justice Jackson stated in Herb v. Pitcairn, "[state] 
courts may ajudicate both kinds of questions and because it is not 
necessary to their functions to make a sharp separation of the two 
their discussion is often interlaced." 324 u.s., at 127. Only this 
Court has an obligation to limit its jurisdiction to questions of 
federal law. Thus, any plain statement rule 
imposed on the state courts for this Court's 
vr- 3. 
is a requ~'ent 
benefit~ If this Court 
had supervisory powers over the States it would make sense to have a 
plain statement rule, but it is less clear to me that there is a 
clear source of authority that justifies requiring state courts to 
explain their decisions in any particular fashion. 1 
Finally, the plain statement rule presumes that the state 
courts intended to rely on federal authority, unless they state 
otherwise. Again, as~tice Ja~remarked in Herb v. Pitcairn: 
"it seems consistent with the respect due the highest courts of 
states of the Union that they be asked rather than told what they 
have intended. If this imposes an unwelcome burden it should be 
mitigated by the knowledge that it is to protect their jurisdiction 
from unwitting interference as well as to protect our own from 
unwitting renunciation." 324 u.s., at 127-128. I realize that 
researching state law or remanding cases is not the most efficient 
way of dealing with these types of cases, but it seems more 
consistent than the plain statement rule with concepts of 
federalism, such as the allocation of authority between state and 
federal courts. 
Your dissenting opinion in City of Mesquitte v. Alladdin's 
1The authority to promulgate such a rule may derive from this 
Court's power to decide its own jurisdiction. Thus, even when 
the Court's jurisdiction has been unclear, it has assumed 
jurisdiction, vacated and remanded for the state court to explain 
the basis of its decision. This plain statement requirement 
could be justified as a less intrusive way of determining the 






Castle seems to be more in line with the traditional approach to 
these questions than the approach proposed in Justice O'Connor's 
draft. In City of Mesquitte, the Court of Appeals 2 had relied on 
both federal and state law to hold a state statute unconstitutional. 
You took a searching look at the state court decisions cited below 
and concluded that these state decisions had relied on federal law. 
Thus the Court of Appeals' passing reference to state decisions did 
not divest this Court of jurisdiction. As I read your opinion, this 
Court may exercise jurisdiction where it is clear that the opinion 
below did not rely on state law and this Court may examine the cases 
to make that determination. As I read Justice O'Connor's opinion, 
she would eschew the kind of close look that you took in City of 
Mesquitte. Under her approach, the ambiguity that existed in City 
of Mesquitte would be resolved in favor of this Court's jurisdiction 
without further inquiry. While City of Mesquitte does not support 
Justice O'Connor's approach, I would not think it would preclude you 
from joining her opinion. Justice O'Connor acknowledges that the 
Court has tried varying ways of dealing with the independent and 
adequate state grounds issue and states that they have been 
inefficient. Thus, the opinion admittedly is a departure from past 
precedent and one could join it on that basis. 
If you are inclined to join, it seems to me that are 
strong practical reasons for adopting the rule proposed by the 
2The posture of these cases is different. City of Mesquitte 
came from a federal court, while this case comes from a state 
court. Thus, in City of Mesquitte there was less reason for this 
Court to refrain from reaching the federal question. 
~· 
5. 
opinion. And I do not see that many problems with Justice 
O'Connor's general treatment of the issue. Specific criticisms that 
might be noted are as follows (my constructive suggestions are 3 and 
4; 1 and 2 are primarily quibbles with the opinion's reasoning): 
1. On page 6, the opinion states that remanding to have a state 
court clarify the basis for its judgment "place[s] significant 
burdens on state courts to demonstrate the presence or absence of 
our jurisdiction." But the plain statement rule places the same 
burden on the state courts and does so for precisely the same 
reason. 
2. On page 6, the opinion states that dismissal of cases is not a 
feasible alternative because the need for federal uniformity is 
frustrated when "we fail to review an opinion that rests primarily 
upon federal grounds and where the independence of an alleged state 
ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion." There 
is a great deal of force to this argument, but it is not clear that 
acceptance of a plain statement rule would cure this lack of 
uniformity completely. A state court could choose to make 
alternative state and federal holdings, each independent of the 
other. In such a case, the federal holding would be unreviewable 
and would frustrate the goal of federal uniformity. It would seem 
that the Court has accepted some lack of uniformity as a cost of 
having a federal system. Further, any conflict can be resolved by a 
subsequent decision of this Court. 
o. 
3. On page 7, he opinion states that adopting a plain statement 
rule "obvia es in most instances the need to examine state law ••• 
and wi 11 the same time avoid the danger of our rendering advisory 
It is questionable whether the plain statement rule will 
avoid the danger of rendering advisory opinions. Under such a rule, 
the Court will decide federal issues in cases where it is arguable 
that the judgment rests on independent and adequate state grounds, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that the federal opinion will be 
advisory. I assume Justice O'Connor must mean that a plain 1 
statement rule will prevent the Court from rendering advisory 
opinions on state law. It might be helpful to make that point 
clear. 
4. On pages 8-9, the opinion applies the test that it announced. 
But in so doing, the opinion combs through the case to find whether 
it relied on federal or state law. It even notes circumstances 
outside of the four corners of the document--i.e., Michigan's 
treatment of the Fourth Amendment in other cases--to determine 
whether the lower court's decision rests on state or federal law. 
This sort of inquiry undercuts the test the opinion just 
established. In my view, the opinion would be stronger if it simply 
noted that the decision below relies primarily on Terry v. Ohio and 
that it contains no "plain statement ••• that the federal cases 
[did] not themselves compel the result that the court ••• reached." 
(p. 7}. By engaging in a less searching analysis, the Court would 
demonstrate that it means to apply its plain statement rule 
strictly. 
March 15, 1983 
82-256 Michigan v. Lona 
Oear Bill: 
Since undertaking the dissent in this caAe, I have 
looked more thoroughly at r.Uchigan law. 'rhts has lee'! me to 
question my initial view that the judgment below rested on 
independent and adequate state grounds. 
As a general matter I believe Michigan has inter -
preteii art 1, §11 independently of the Fourth Amendment. As 
the Supreme Court of Michigan explicitly stated in People v. 
Secrest, 413 Mich. 521, 525 (1982), "we have imPosed a high-
er standarn under the state provision than the federal when 
the item seized is not one within the proviso of the third 
sentence of art 1, ~11." But I do not believe that Secrest 
controls this case. 
'T'he problem arises from the proviso to art l, ~11. 
th~t states "[t]he provisions of this sectton shall not be 
construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding 
any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other 
dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the cur-
tilage of any dwelling house in this state." Thus, even if 
a search otherwise would be unreasonable under art 1, ~11, 
the proviso purports to prevent certain categories of evi-
dence obtained duri.ng the search from being excluded at 
critrtine'\l trials. 
As a state con~titution cannot authorize the ad-
mission of evi.dence that the federaJ constitution would ex-
clude, Michigan has recognized that the effect of the provi-
so is to wpreclud[e] a construction of the Michi~an sea~ch 
and seizure clause imposing a higher standard of reasonable-
ness for searches and seizures of items named in the provi-
sion than the United States Supreme Court has held applica-
ble under the Fourth Amendment . " People v . Moore, 391 Mich. 
426, 435 (1974). ~he exclusion of evidence of the types 
specified in this proviso therefore is governed by the fed-
eral constitution. Thus, the issue on which this case ulti-
mately turns appears to he whether marijuana {the druq in-
volved here) is a "narcotic drug" within the meaning of the 
proviso . 
The respondent's brief asserts that the proviso is 
not applicable because Michigan no longer classifies mari-
juana as a narcotic. See 1978 Mich . Pub. Acts 368 (codified 
at Mich. Comp . Laws Ann. §333 . 7107) . The Michigan courts 
have held consistently, however, that state constitutional 
provisions should be interpreted in light of the laws exist-
ing when the provisions were ratified. See Bacon v. Kent-
Ottawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 170-171 (1958). Indeed, 
the state courts appear to have been rather strict about not 
construing constituti.onal provisions in light of subsequent 
statutory changes. See Walker v. Wayne Circui.t Judqe, 2 
Mich. App. 145, 148-149 (1.966): Jones v. Citv of Ypsilanti, 
26 Mich. App. 574, 578-579 (1970). As marijuana was classi-
fied as a narcotic drug when the state constitution was rat-
ified in 1963, see 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts 206, I doubt that 
the subsequent statutory chanae alters the coverage of the 
proviso. 
Although the state courts have not addressed the 
specific question whether mariiuana is a narcotic, they ap-
pear to have assumed that marijuana falls within the cover-
age of the proviso. In People v. Monroe, 3 Mich. App. 544 
(1966), the state court did not bother to consider whether 
the search that led to the discovery of mariiuana wn~ pro-
hibited by the first part of art 1, Sll but simply admitted 
the marijuana into evidence on the basis of the J?roviso. 
See also People v. Barket:, 18 "'1ich. Aop. '=>44 (1.969) (Levin, 
,J., concur.r ing) • But cf. People v. Smith, 31 Mich. App. 366, 
373 (1971) (apparently holding that the li'ourth Amendment 
voided the proviso to art 1, §ll). 
Even if the state courts were to disregard the law 
existing at the time the constitutional provision was rati-
fied, the purpose of the proviso clearly appears to have 
been to allow the admissJ.on of contraband at criminal tri-
als. This betnq so, it is unlikely Michiqan would apply its 
"higher standard" to any type of contraband drug. In this 
case, the Michigan court stated that the search was invalid 
under both the federal and state constitutions. Equating 
the two provisions suqgests that the court had in mind its 
recognition that the proviso, which is applicable to 
contraband-type articles, had been construed to conform to 
the federal constitution. This perhaps explains why the 
court did not undertake any i.ndependent analysis of the 
state constitution but relied solely upon this court's 
Fourth Amendment decisions. 
As you know, Bill, I was inclined to agree with 
majority on the mPrits but initially shared vour view that 
the case should be disposed of as resting on independent and 
adequate st~te grounds. Since I now have substantial ques-
tions about the independence of the state grounds, I am 
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. , ~-
~: ~::·" I 
\~ I have read with special interest your first draft~ 
of an opinion in this case, a draft not yet circulated. I <t 
make the following observations: . __ ,. , ",, .. ~ 
";'wil >•~ fi . .,1 
'· V'\, ~ ' · .. 
Your "plain sta te~ent" ,·rul~e for' deterl'lin inq th i's' . ~ , 
Court's jurisdiction would be: If a state court's decision)~~ 
"fairly . appears to rest primarily on federal la•li, "' we will /·~""i~ 
presume that this Court has jurisdiction unless the state ~~ 
court has indicated clearly and expressly that its judgment 
rests on indepenrlent and adequate state grounds. As a work-
ing principle the rule is salutary and practi,cal consider,-::- · 
at ions!.t~~;st,ronq ly····.' support .it. ;1• ~ . · ~~i, · ··.~~ 
~~~jm~ . ~"l'·· ~, t:i' : ~ .• • 11 ~ 
· There are, as I am sure you fully ~ppreciate, 
theoretical problems with such a rule. It ~_i. s elementary 
that this Court h~s no jurisdiction where a state court's 
judgment rests on independent and adequate state grounds. 
As this is a jurisdictional question, we have thought it 
necessary either to remand a doubtful case to the state 
court or we have undertaken our own review of. state law. I :.1r 
took this approach recently in my dissenting opinion in City 
of Mesquite v. Alladin's Castle (last Term). ~ 
c ~ustice Jackson addressed this problem in Herb 
v. Pitcairn~ 324 u.s. 117 (1945), in which - among other 




"lilt seems consistent with respect to the 
highest courts of states of the Union that 
they be asked rather than told what they have 
int~nded. If this imposei~ an unwelcome bur-
den i t ~, should be mitigated· by the knowledgE> 
that it is to protect their jurisdiction from 
unwitting interference as well as to protect 
our own frorn unwitting renunciation." . Id., 




'.".i .'1 ~~ 
1: 
I confess being torn between the obvious advantage 
to us of your "Plain statement" rule and the tradi.tional <,if,···' 
'i concern of this Court not to exercise a jurisdiction tha e ":- , 
·,.might in fact properly lie with a state. After all, we are 
~··· a court of limited jurisdiction. On balance, however, I 
would join four other Justices in adapting your rule in view 
of the strong practical reasons that justify it. 
!r'!i' ,, 
Perhaps it would be desirable for your opinion to 
~address somewhat more specifically what I have called the 
theoretical problems with a pragmatic rule. tn my view, 
these problems are more theoretical than realistic - since 
complying with "YYUr prouosed rule would har~ly be burdensome 
except where a state court may have reason deliberately to 
pass the buck to us as perhaPs the Michigan courts have been 
doing. , 
Z I note that in this case, your footnote 7 actuallv 
disposes of any argument that the decision below was based '· 
on an independent and adequate state ground. 
,, d ~·~ 
I appreciate your givinq me the OPPortunity 
make advance comments on your OPinion. I aoolaud your 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity 
of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable 
cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police of-
ficer the right "to neutralize the threat of physical harm," id., 
at 24, when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an indi-
vidual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, ex-
pressly address whether such a protective search for weap-
ons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence 
of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent 
David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found 
by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the 
automobile that he was driving. The police searched the 
passenger compartment because they had reason to believe 
that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to 
the officers. We hold that the protective search of the pas-
senger compartment was reasonable under the principles 
articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We 
also examine Long's argument that the decision below rests 
upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we de-
cide in favor of our jurisdiction. 
I 
Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area 
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car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. 1 The offi-
cers observed the car. turning down a side road, where it 
swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to in-
vestigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met 
the deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding 
from the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side 
of the vehicle was left open. 
Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's 
license, but he did not respond. After the request was re-
peated, Long produced his license. Long again failed to re-
spond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle 
registration. After another repeated request, Long, whom 
Howell thought "appeared to be under the influence of some-
thing," 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N. W. 2d 866, 868 (1982), 
turned from the officers and began walking toward the open 
door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both ob-
served a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's 
side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress 
1 It is clear, and the respondent concedes, that if the officers had ar-
rested Long for speeding or for driving while intoxicated, they could have 
searched the passenger compartment under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 
454 (1981), and the trunk under United States v. Ross, -- U. S. --
(1982), if they had probable cause to believe that the trunk contained con-
traband. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 41. However, at oral argument, the State 
informed us that while Long could have been arrested for a speeding viola-
tion under Michigan law, he was not arrested because "[a]s a matter of 
practice," police in Michigan do not arrest for speeding violations unless 
"more" is involved. See Tr. Oral Arg., at 6. The officers did issue Long 
an appearance ticket. The petitioner also confirmed that the officers could 
have arrested Long for driving while intoxicated but they "would have to 
go through a process to make a determination as to whether the party is 
intoxicated and then go from that point." I d., at 6. 
The court below treated this case as involving a protective search, and 
not a search justified by probable cause to arrest for speeding, driving 
while intoxicated, or any other offense. Further, the petitioner does not 
argue that if probable cause to arrest exists, but the officers do not actually 
effect the arrest, that the police may nevertheless conduct a search as 
broad as those authorized by Belton and Ross. Accordingly, we do not 
address that issue. 
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and subjected him to a Terry protective pat-down, which re-
vealed no weapons. 
Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehi-
cle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior 
of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of 
Howell's action was "to search for other weapons." I d., at 
469, 320 N. W. 2d, at 868. The officer noticed that some-
thing was protruding from under the armrest on the front 
seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He 
saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his 
light on the pouch, determined that it contained what ap-
peared to be marijuana. After Deputy Howell showed the 
pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested 
for possession of marijuana. A further search of the interior 
of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more 
contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers de-
cided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the 
trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it ap-
proximately 75 pounds of marijuana. 
The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to 
suppress the marijuana taken from both the interior of the 
car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of posses-
sion of marijuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed 
Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger 
compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry, 
supra, and that the search of the trunk was valid as an inven-
tory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 
(1976). See 94 Mich. App. 338, 288 N. W. 2d 629 (1979). 
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that 
"the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the 
police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in 
this case." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. The 
marijuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court 
below to be the "fruit" of the illegal search of the interior, and 
was also suppressed. 2 
2 Chief Justice Coleman dissented, arguing that Terry authorized the 
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We granted certiorari in this case to consider the impor-
tant question of the authority of a police officer to protect 
himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger 
compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investiga-
tory stop of the occupant of the vehicle. -- U. S. --
(1982). 
II 
Before reaching the merits, we must consider Long's argu-
ment that we are without jurisdiction to decide this case be-
cause the decision below rests on an adequate and independ-
ent state ground. The court below referred twice to the 
state constitution in its opinion, but otherwise relied exclu-
sively on federal law. 3 Long argues that the Michigan 
courts have provided greater protection from searches and 
seizures under the state constitution than is afforded under 
the Fourth Amendment, and the references to the state con-
stitution therefore establish an adequate and independent 
ground for the decision below. 
It is, of course, "incumbent upon this Court ... to ascer-
tain for itself ... whether the asserted non-federal ground 
independently and adequately supports the judgment." 
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 773 (1931). Al-
though we have announced a number of principles in order 
to help us determine whether various forms of references 
area search, and that the trunk search was a valid inventory search. See 
413 Mich., at 473-480, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870-873. Justice Moody con-
curred in the result on the ground that the trunk search was improper. 
He agreed with Chief Justice Coleman that the interior search was proper 
under Terry. See id., at 480-486, 320 N. W. 2d, 873-875. 
3 On the first occasion, the court merely cited in a footnote both the 
state and federal constitutions. See 413 Mich., at 471 , n. 4, 320 N. W. 2d, 
at 869, n. 4. On the second occasion, at the conclusion of the opinion, the 
court stated: "We hold, therefore, that the deputies' search of the vehicle 
was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution." Id. , at 472-473, 320 
N. W. 2d, at 870. 
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to state law constitute adequate and independent state 
grounds, 4 we openly admit that we have thus far not devel-
oped a satisfying and consistent approach for resolving this 
vexing issue. In some instances, we have taken the strict 
view that if the ground of decision was at all unclear, we 
would dismiss the case. See, e. g., Lynch v. New York, 293 
U. S. 52 (1934). In other instances, we have vacated, see, 
e. g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co, 309 U. S. 551 (1940), or 
continued a case, see e. g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 
(1945), in order to obtain clarification about the nature of a 
state court decision. See also California v. Krivda, 409 
U. S. 33 (1972). In more recent cases, we have ourselves 
examined state law to determine whether state courts have 
used federal law to guide their application of state law 
or to provide the actual basis for the decision that was 
reached. See also Delaware v. Prouse, supra, and Zacchini 
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., supra. In Oregon v. 
Kennedy,-- U.S.--,----- (1982), we rejected an 
'For example, we have long recognized that "where the judgment of a 
state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other 
non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is 
independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment." 
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). We may review a 
state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an 
available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly 
have relied. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35, 37, n. 3 (1967). Also, if, 
in our view, the state court" 'felt compelled by what it understood to be 
federal constitutional considerations to construe ... its own law in the 
manner that it did,' " then we will not treat a normally adequate state 
ground as independent, and there will be no question about our jurisdic-
tion. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653 (1979) (quoting Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977)). See also 
South Dakota v. Neville, -- U. S. --, --, n. 3 (1983). Finally, 
"where the non-federal ground is so interwoven with the [federal ground] 
as not to be an independent matter, or is not of sufficient breadth to sustain 
the judgment without any decision of the other, our jurisdiction is plain." 
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Company, 243 
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invitation to remand to the state court for clarification even 
when the decision rested in part on a case from the state 
court, because we determined that the state case itself rested 
upon federal grounds. We added that "[e]ven if the case ad-
mitted of more doubt as to whether federal and state grounds 
were intermixed, the fact that the state court relied to the 
extent it did on federal grounds requires us to reach the mer-
its." !d., at--. 
This ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve pos-
sible adequate and independent state grounds is antithetical 
to the doctrinal consistency that is required when sensitive 
issues of federal-state relations are involved. Moreover, 
none of the various methods of disposition that we have em-
ployed thus far recommends itself as the preferred method 
that we should apply to the exclusion of others, and we there-
fore determine that it is appropriate to reexamine our treat-
ment of this jurisdictional issue in order to achieve the consis-
tency that is necessary. 
The process that we have employed in cases such as Dela-
ware v. Prouse is unsatisfactory because it requires us to in-
terpret state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar, 
and which often, as in this case, have not been discussed at 
length by the parties. Vacation and continuance for clari-
fication have also been unsatisfactory both because of the de-
lay and decrease in efficiency of judicial administration, see 
Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U. S. 143 (1952), 5 and, more important, 
because these methods of disposition place significant bur-
dens on state courts to demonstrate the presence or absence 
of our jurisdiction. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. 
5 Indeed, Dixon v. Duffy is also illustrative of another difficulty in-
volved in our requiring state courts to reconsider their decisions for pur-
poses of clarification. In Dixon, we continued the case on two occasions in 
order to obtain clarification, but none was forthcoming: "[T]he California 
court advised petitioner's counsel informally that it doubted its jurisdiction 
to render such a determination." 344 U. S., at 145. We then vacated the 
judgment of the state court, and remanded. 
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Jerome, 434 U. S. 241, 244 (1978) (REHNQUIST, J., dissent-
ing); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U. S. 425, 
427 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Finally, outright dis-
missal of cases is clearly not a panacea because it cannot be 
doubted that there is an important need for uniformity in fed-
eral law, and that this need goes unsatisfied when we fail to 
review an opinion that rests primarily upon federal grounds 
and where the independence of an alleged state ground is not 
apparent from the four corners of the opinion. We have long 
recognized that dismissal is inappropriate "where there is 
strong indication ... that the federal constitution as judi-
cially construed controlled the decision below." National 
Tea Co., supra, 309 U. S., at 556 (1940). 
Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as 
avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cor-
nerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there 
is an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely 
because of this respect for state courts, and this desire to 
avoid advisory opinions, that we do not wish to continue to 
decide issues of state law that go beyond the opinion that we 
review, or to require state courts to reconsider cases to clar-
ify the grounds of their decisions. Accordingly, when, as in 
this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primar-
ily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, 
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible 
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we 
will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state 
court decided the case the way it did because it believed that 
federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses 
merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the prece-
dents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear 
by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the fed-
eral cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, 
and do not themselves compel the result that the court has 
reached. In this way, both justice and judicial administra-
tion will be greatly improved. If the state court decision in-
82--25&--0PINION 
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dicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on 
bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, 
of course, will not undertake to review the decision. 
This approach obviates in most instances the need to exam-
ine state law in order to decide the nature of the state court 
decision, and will at the same time avoid the danger of our 
rendering advisory opinions. 6 It also avoids the unsatisfac-
tory and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify 
their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court. We believe 
that such an approach will provide state judges with a clearer 
opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by 
federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of 
federal law. "It is fundamental that state courts be left free 
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. 
But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudi-
cations by state courts do not stand as barriers to a deter-
mination by this Court of the validity under the federal con-
stitution of state action." National Tea Co., supra, 309 
U. 8., at 557. 
The principle that we will not review judgments of state 
courts that rest on adequate and independent state grounds 
is based, in part, on "the limitations of our own jurisdiction." 
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125 (1945). 7 The jurisdic-
6 There may be certain circumstances in which clarification is necessary 
or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from taking the appropriate 
action. 
7 In Herb v. Pitcairn, supra, the Court also wrote that it was desirable 
that state courts "be asked rather than told what they have intended." It 
is clear that we have already departed from that view in those cases in 
which we have examined state law to determine whether a particular re-
sult was guided or compelled by federal law. Our decision today departs 
further from Herb insofar as we disfavor further requests to state courts 
for clarification, and we require a clear and express statement that a deci-
sion rests on adequate and independent state grounds. However, the 
"plain statement" rule protects the integrity of state courts for the reasons 
discussed above. The preference for clarification expressed in Herb has 
failed to be a completely satisfactory means of protecting the state and fed-
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tional concern is that we not "render an avisory opinion, and 
if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court 
after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could 
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion." I d., at 
126. Our requirement of a "plain statement" that a decision 
rests upon adequate and independent state grounds does not 
in any way authorize the rendering of advisory opinions. 
Rather, in determining, as we must, whether we have juris-
diction to review a case that is alleged to rest on adequate 
and independent state grounds, see Abie State Bank v. 
Bryan, supra, 282 U. 8., at 773, we merely assume that 
there are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opin-
ion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and in-
dependent state ground and when it fairly appears that the 
state court rested its decision primarily on federallaw. 8 
Our review of the decision below under this framework 
leaves us unconvinced that it rests upon an independent state 
ground. Apart from its two citations to the state constitu-
tion, the court below relied exclusively on its understanding 
of Terry and other federal cases. Not a single state case was 
cited to support the state court's holding that the search of 
the passenger compartment was unconstitutional. 9 Indeed, 
era! interests that are involved. 
8 It is not unusual for us to employ certain presumptions in deciding ju-
risdictional issues. For instance, although the petitioner bears the burden 
of establishing our jurisdiction, Durley v. Mayo, 351 U. S. 277, 285 (1956), 
we have held that the party who alleges that a controversy before us has 
become moot has the "heavy burden" of establishing that we lack jurisdic-
tion. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U. S. 625, 631 (1979). That is, 
we presume in those circumstances that we have jurisdiction until some 
party establishes that we do not for reasons of mootness. 
9 At oral argument, Long argued that the state court relied on its deci-
sion in People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N. W. 2d 867, cert. denied, 422 
U. S. 1044 (1975). See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 29. However, the court cited 
that case only in the context of a statement that the State did not seek to 
justify the search in this case "by reference to other exceptions to the war-
rant requirement." 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869-870 (footnote 
,l 
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the court declared that the search in this case was unconstitu-
tional because "[t]he Court of Appeals erroneously applied 
the principles of Terry v. Ohio ... to the search of the inte-
rior of the vehicle in this case." 413 Mich., at 471, 320 N. W. 
2d, at 869. The references to the state constitution in no 
way indicate that the decision below rested on grounds in any 
way independent from the state court's interpretation of fed-
erallaw. Even if we accept that the Michigan constitution 
has been interpreted to provide independent protection for 
certain rights also secured under the Fourth Amendment, it 
fairly appears in this case that the Michigan Supreme Court 
rested its decision primarily on federal law. 
Rather than dismissing the case, or requiring that the 
state court reconsider its decision on our behalf solely be-
cause of a mere possibility that an adequate and independent 
ground supports the judgment, we find that we have jurisdic-
tion in the absence of a plain statement that the decision 
below rested on an adequate and independent state ground. 
It appears to us that the state court "felt compelled by what 
it understood to be federal constitutional considerations 
to construe . . . its own law in the manner that it did." 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 
562, 568 (1977). 10 
omitted). The court then noted that Reed held that "A warrantless search 
and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the state constitution un-
less shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule." !d., at 472--473, 
n. 8, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870, n. 8. 
10 There is nothing unfair about requiring a plain statement of an inde-
pendent state ground in this case. Even if we were to rest our decision on 
an evaluation of the state law relevant to Long's claim, as we have some-
times done in the past, our understanding of Michigan law would also result 
in our finding that we have jurisdiction to decide this case. Under state 
search and seizure law, a "higher standard" is imposed under art. 1, § 11 of 
the 1963 Michigan Constitution. See People v. Secrist, 413 Mich. 521, 525, 
321 N. W. 2d 368, 369 (1982). If, however, the item seized is, inter alia, a 
"narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any 
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III 
The court below held, and respondent Long contends, that 
Deputy Howell's entry into the vehicle cannot be justified 
under the principles set forth in Terry because Terry author-
ized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of 
criminal activity rather than a search of an area. 413 Mich., 
dwelling house in this state," art. 1, § 11 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, 
then the seizure is governed by a standard identical to that imposed by the 
Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 216 N. W. 
2d 770, 775 (1974). 
Long argues that under the current Michigan Public Health Code 
§ 333.7107, the definition of a "narcotic" does not include marijuana. The 
difficulty with this argument is that Long fails to cite any authority for the 
proposition that the term "narcotic" as used in the Michigan constitution is 
dependent on current statutory definitions of that term. Indeed, it ap-
pears that just the opposite is true. The Michigan Supreme Court has 
held that constitutional provisions are presumed "to be interpreted in ac-
cordance with existing laws and legal usages of the time" of the passage of 
the provision. Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 169, 92 
N. W. 2d 492, 497 (1958). If the state legislature were able to change the 
interpretation of a constitutional provision by statute, then the legislature 
would have "the power of outright repeal of a duly-voted constitutional 
provision." Ibid. Applying these principles, the Michigan courts have 
held that a statute passed subsequent to the applicable state constitutional 
provision is not relevant for interpreting its constitution, and that a defini-
tion in a legislative act pertains only to that act. Jones v. City of Ypsi-
lanti, 26 Mich. App. 574, 182 N. W. 2d 795 (1970). See also Walber v. 
Wayne Circuit Judge, 2 Mich. App. 145, 138 N. W. 2d 772 (1966), aff'd, 381 
Mich. 138, 160 N. W. 2d 876 (1968). At the time that the 1963 Michigan 
Constitution was enacted, it is clear that marijuana was considered a nar-
cotic drug. See 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 266, § 1. Indeed, it appears 
that marijuana was considered a narcotic drug in Michigan until1978, when 
it was removed from the narcotic classification. We would conclude that 
the seizure of marijuana in Michigan is not subject to analysis under any 
"higher standard" that may be imposed on the seizure of other items. In 
the light of our holding in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, that an interpreta-
tion of state law in our view compelled by federal constitutional consider-
ations is not an independent state ground, we would have jurisdiction to 
decide the case. 
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at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869 (footnote omitted). Brief for 
Respondent, p. 10. Although Terry did involve the protec-
tive frisk of a person, we believe that the police action in this 
case is justified by the principles that we have already estab-
lished in Terry and other cases. 
In Terry, the Court examined the validity of a "stop and 
frisk" in the absence of probable cause and a warrant. The 
police officer in Terry detained several suspects to ascertain 
their identities after the officer had observed the suspects for 
a brief period of time and formed the conclusion that they 
were about to engage in criminal activity. Because the offi-
cer feared that the suspects were armed, he patted down 
the outside of the suspects' clothing and discovered two 
revolvers. 
Examining the reasonableness of the officer's conduct in 
Terry, 11 we held that there is '"no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or 
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] en-
tails."' 392 U. S., at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U. S. 523, 536-537 (1967)). Although the conduct 
of the officer in Terry involved a "severe, though brief, intru-
sion upon cherished personal security," 392 U. S., at 24-25, 
11 Although we did not in any way weaken the warrant requirement, we 
acknowledged that the typical "stop and frisk" situation involves "an entire 
rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-
the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not 
been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant pro-
cedure. Instead, the conduct in this case must be tested by the Fourth 
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures." 392 U. S., at 20 (footnote omitted). We have emphasized that 
the propriety of a Terry stop and frisk is to be judged according to whether 
the officer acted as a "reasonably prudent man" in deciding that the intru-
sion was justified. Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 27. "A brief stop of a sus-
picious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the sta-
tus quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most 
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Adams 
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972). 
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we found that the conduct was reasonable when we weighed 
the interest of the individual against the legitimate interest 
in "crime detection and prevention," id., at 23, and the "need 
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other 
prospective victims of violence in situations where they lack 
probable cause for an arrest." I d., at 24. When the officer 
has a reasonable belief "that the individual whose suspicious 
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and pres-
ently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to 
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take 
necessary measures to determine whether the person is in 
fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physi-
cal harm." Ibid. 
Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent 
pat-down search of a person, we were careful to note that 
"[w]e need not develop at length in this case, however, the 
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a pro-
tective search and seizure for weapons. These limitations 
will have to be developed in the concrete factual circum-
stances of individual cases." I d., at 29. Contrary to Long's 
view, Terry did not restrict the preventative search to the 
person of the detained suspect. 12 
In two cases in which we applied Terry to specific factual 
situations, we recognized that investigative detentions in-
volving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with dan-
ger to police officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U. S. 106 (1972), we held that police may order persons out of 
'
2 As Chief Justice Coleman noted in her dissenting opinion in the 
present case: 
"The opinion in Terry authorized the frisking of an overcoat worn by 
defendant because that was the issue presented by the facts. One could 
reasonably conclude that a different result would not have been constitu-
tionally required if the overcoat had been carried, folded over the forearm, 
rather than worn. The constitutional principles in Terry would still 
control." 
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an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may 
frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief 
that they are armed and dangerous. Our decision rested in 
part on the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he ap-
proaches a person seated in an automobile." I d., at 110. In 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), we held that the 
police, acting on an informant's tip, may reach into the pas-
senger compartment of an automobile to remove a gun from a 
driver's waistband even where the gun was not apparent to 
police from outside the car and the police knew of its exist-
ence only because of the tip. Again, our decision rested in 
part on our view of the danger presented to police officers in 
"traffic stop" and automobile situations. 13 
Finally, we have also expressly recognized that suspects 
may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access 
to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed. 
In the Term following Terry, we decided Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), which involved the limitations im-
posed on police authority to conduct a search incident to a 
valid arrest. Relying explicitly on Terry, we held that when 
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his imme-
diate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from 
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or de-
structible evidence." I d., at 763. We reasoned that "[a] 
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested 
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed 
in the clothing of the person arrested." Ibid. In New York 
v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), we determined that the lower 
courts "have found no workable definition of 'the area within 
'
3 "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings 
occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an auto-
mobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. 
Crim. L. C. & P. S. 93 (1963)." Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U. S., at 
148, n. 3 . 
82-256-0PINION 
MICHIGAN v. LONG 15 
the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area argu-
ably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is 
its recent occupant." I d., at 460. In order to provide a 
"workable rule," ibid., we held that "articles inside the rela-
tively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, 
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order 
to grab a weapon' .... " Ibid. (quoting Chimel, supra, 395 
U. S., at 763). We also held that the police may examine the 
contents of any open or closed container found within the pas-
senger compartment, "for if the passenger compartment is 
within the reach of the arrestee, so will containers in it be 
within his reach." 453 U. S., at 460. (footnote omitted). 
See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702 (1981). 
Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and 
others can justify protective searches when police have a rea-
sonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside 
encounters between police and suspects are especially haz-
ardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence 
of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These princi-
ples compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in 
which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the 
police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers 
to believe that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may 
gain immediate control of weapons. 14 See Terry, 392 U. S., 
14 We stress that our decision does not mean that the police may conduct 
automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop, although 
the "bright line" that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search 
whenever officers effect a custodial arrest. An additional interest exists 
in the arrest context, i . e., preservation of evidence, and this justifies an 
"automatic" search. However, that additional interest does not exist in 
the Terry context. A Terry search, "unlike a search without a warrant 
incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disap-
,l 
82-25~0PINION 
16 MICHIGAN v. LONG 
at 21. "The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or those of others was in danger." ld., at 27. If a 
suspect is "dangerous," he is no less dangerous simply be-
cause he is not arrested. If, while conducting a legitimate 
Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer 
should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he 
clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the 
Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such 
circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
465 (1971); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978); 
Texas v. Brown,-- U.S.--,--,-- (1983) (plurality 
opinion by REHNQUIST, J., and opinion concurring in the 
judgment by POWELL, J.). 
The circumstances of this case clearly justified Deputies 
Howell and Lewis in their reasonable belief that Long posed 
a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle. The 
hour was late and the area rural. Long was driving his auto-
mobile at excessive speed, ~nd his car swerved into a ditch. 
The officers had to repeat their questions to Long, who ap-
peared to be "under the influence" of some intoxicant. The 
intrusion was "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which 
justifi[ed] its initiation." Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 26. 
Long was not frisked until the officers observed that there 
was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long 
pearance or destruction of evidence of crime .. .. The sole justification of 
the search ... is the protection of police officers and others nearby .. . . " 
392 U. S., at 29. What we borrow now from Chimel and Belton is merely 
the recognition that part of the reason to allow area searches incident to an 
arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be armed, may be able to 
gain access to weapons to injure officers or others nearby, or otherwise to 
hinder legitimate police activity. This recognition applies as well in the 
Terry context. However, because the interest in collecting and preserv-
ing evidence is not present in the Terry context, we require that officers 
who conduct area searches during investigative detentions must do so only 
when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry. 
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was about to reenter. The subsequent search of the car was 
restricted to those areas to which Long would generally have 
immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. The 
trial court determined that the leather pouch containing mar-
ijuana could have contained a weapon. App. 64a. 15 
In evaulating the validity of an officer's investigative or 
protective conduct under Terry, the "[t]ouchstone of our 
analysis ... is always 'the reasonableness in all circum-
stances of the particular government intrusion of a citizen's 
personal security."' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 434 
U. S., at 108-109 (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 19). 
In this case, the officers did not act unreasonably in taking 
preventive measures to ensure that there were no other 
weapons within Long's immediate grasp before permitting 
him to reenter his automobile. Therefore, the balancing re-
quired by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police 
to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to 
uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable and 
objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially 
dangerous. 
The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it 
was not reasonable for the officers to believe that Long could 
injure them, because he was effectively under their control 
during the investigative stop and could not get access to any 
weapons that might have been located in the automobile. 
See 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. This reasoning 
is mistaken in several respects. During any investigative 
detention, the suspect is "in the control" of the officers in the 
sense that he "may be briefly detained against his will . . . . " 
Terry, supra, 392 U. S., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Just 
as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the 
brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing andre-
trieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long's position 
15 Of course, our analysis would apply to justify the search of Long's per-
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break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from 
his automobile. See United States v. Rainone, 586 F. 2d 
1132, 1134 (CA71978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979). In 
addition, if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be 
permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have ac-
cess to any weapons inside. United States v. Powless, 546 
F. 2d 792, 795-796 (CAS), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 910 (1977). 
Or, as here, the suspect may be permitted to reenter the ve-
hicle before the Terry investigation is over, and again, may 
have access to weapons. In any event, we stress that a 
Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, in-
volves a police investigation "at close range," Terry, supra, 
392 U. S., at 24, when the officer remains particularly vul-
nerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been 
effected, and the officer must make a "quick decision as to 
how to protect himself and others from possible danger." 
I d., at 28. In such circumstances, we have not required that 
officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order 
to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter. 16 
'
6 Long makes a number of arguments concerning the invalidity of the 
search of the passenger compartment. The thrust of these arguments is 
that Terry searches are limited in scope and that an area search is funda-
mentally inconsistent with this limited scope. We have recognized that 
Terry searches are limited insofar as they may not be conducted in the ab-
sence of an articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see e. g., 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 65 (1968), and that they are protective 
in nature and limited to weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 
93-94 (1979). However, neither of these concerns is violated by our deci-
sion. To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons, 
the officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially 
dangerous. 
Long also argues that there cannot be a legitimate Terry search based on 
the discovery of the hunting knife because Long possessed that weapon le- . 
gally. See Brief for Respondent, p. 17. Assuming arguendo that Long 
possessed the knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view that the 
validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon is possessed in 
accordance with state law. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 
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IV 
The trial court and the court of appeals upheld the search 
of the trunk as a valid inventory search under this Court's de-
cision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976). 
The Michigan Supreme Court did not address this holding, 
and instead suppressed the marijuana taken from the trunk 
as a fruit of the illegal search of the interior of the automo-
bile. Our holding that the initial search was justified under 
Terry makes it necessary to determine whether the trunk 
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
However, we decline to address this question because it was 
not passed upon by the Michigan Supreme Court, whose deci-
sion we review in this case. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 
394 U. S. 437, 438 (1969). We remand this issue to the court 
below, to enable it to determine whether the trunk search 
was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions 
of this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross,-- U. S. 
--, (1982). 17 
v 
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
(1972). 
17 Long suggests that the trunk search is invalid under state law. See 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 41, 43--44. The Michigan Supreme Court is, of course, 
free to determine the validity of that search under state law. 
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